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Abstract 
Information processing biases are purportedly involved in the development and 
maintenance of psychological difficulties. Reviews collating bias research are 
considerable for conditions such as anxiety; however, similar research summary 
in the field of bipolar disorder was considered absent. Consequently, a 
systematic review was conducted to investigate information processing biases 
in different cycle states of bipolar disorder compared to control participants. The 
review focused on processing bias rather than deficit or impairment. Information 
processing biases pertaining to attention, interpretation, and memory were 
included in the review. Of the initial 2476 articles identified, 28 qualified for 
inclusion in the review based on inclusion/exclusion criteria. Evidence of 
differences in processing biases between individuals with bipolar and controls 
was demonstrated; however, manifestation of bias varied considerably and was 
often conflicting. Although there is evidence of cycle-specific biases, such as 
negatively biased selective attention in depressive states and positive 
interpretation bias in manic states, the need for further research to clarify the 
frequent inconsistencies found is emphasised. Furthermore, cycle-specific bias 
may also be observable in euthymic individuals, suggesting that this is not 
necessarily a return to an unaffected state. Processing biases appear present in 
bipolar disorder; however, currently a clear profile is not forthcoming.  
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Systematic Review of Bipolar Disorder and Information Processing: 
Biases of Attention, Interpretation, and Memory 
Information Processing Biases and Psychological Disorders 
Information processing biases have been proposed to play a role in the 
development and maintenance of a range of psychological difficulties. These 
biases trade the accuracy of direct perception with the efficiency of expectation. 
Their influence may be largely automatic (Teachman, Joormann, Steinman, & 
Gotlib, 2012), directing attention, interpretation, and recall of information. Biases 
may provide functional benefits in our ability to make sense of the world; 
however, the trade in accuracy can lead to maladaptive expectation dominating 
perception, such as in anxiety and depression (Mogg & Bradley, 2005).  
Anxiety has been associated with biases towards threatening information 
at all stages of processing, through attention (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van, 2007), interpretation (Eysenck, Mogg, May, 
Richards, & Mathews, 1991), and recall (Coles & Heimberg, 2002). Processing 
biases have also been observed in other psychological conditions, such as 
depression (Leppanen, 2006). Critically, specific psychological conditions may 
relate to specific manifestations of bias – in terms of information content (e.g., 
negative vs. threatening) and stage of processing at which bias occurs (Mogg & 
Bradley, 2005). Consideration of specific information processing biases 
associated with specific psychological conditions may aid insight into the 
development and maintenance of respective conditions. Research has begun 
exploring how bias modification may: 1) demonstrate a causal relation between 
bias and psychological difficulties; and 2) be employed therapeutically (Hertel & 
Mathews, 2011).   
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Bipolar Disorder and Information Processing Biases 
Bipolar disorder is characterised by fluctuations between clinically 
elevated and depressed mood states (American Psychiatric Association., 1994). 
Although less prevalent than anxiety and depression (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, 
Merikangas, & Walters, 2005; Merikangas et al., 2011), bipolar disorder is 
associated with difficulties in social functioning (Calabrese et al., 2003), long-
term health conditions (McIntyre et al., 2006), and substantially elevated risk of 
suicide (Chen & Dilsaver, 1996; Jamison, 2000). Processing biases associated 
with bipolar disorder have, however, received less attention than those of 
anxiety and depression. Previous reviews have focused largely on functional 
and neuropsychological differences associated with cognitive impairment. 
Cognitive impairment may be distinguished from processing bias: Impairment 
refers to diminished or inability to process information; whereas bias refers to a 
propensity to process information in a particular way. Recent reviews suggest 
deficits in memory and executive functioning may be related to depressive and 
manic states (Murphy & Sahakian, 2001; Robinson & Ferrier, 2006). Variability 
in impairment is also proposed as potentially dependent on depressive, manic, 
or euthymic cycle state; however, clear distinction between states was 
inconclusive based on literature available. Interestingly, there is evidence to 
suggest that impairment persists even during euthymic periods (Robinson et al., 
2006). However, the role of medication in all observed bipolar deficits has been 
questioned (Holmes et al., 2008).  
Research into bipolar information processing biases, rather than deficits, 
also exists. A review of cognitive vulnerabilities by Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, 
and Neeren (2006) considered evidence of similarities between information 
processing in bipolar disorder and major depression, such as attention towards 
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negative and self-referent information. Once again there is indication that the 
current cycle state may be important to bias manifestation. Research suggests 
that manic states are associated with affective bias towards positive stimuli 
(Murphy et al., 1999) and decreased recognition of negative facial expressions 
(Lembke & Ketter, 2002). However, presently systematic review 
comprehensively summarising information processing biases in bipolar disorder 
appears absent. The current review was designed to systematically collate 
literature relating to information processing biases, rather than cognitive deficits, 
associated with bipolar disorder with consideration of the different cycle states. 
Method 
Research Questions 
 A systematic review was conducted to address the following research 
questions: 
1. Compared to controls, do individuals with bipolar disorder demonstrate 
biases towards processing different types of information in terms of: 
a. Attention, 
b. Interpretation, 
c. Or memory? 
2. Do processing biases differ in different cycle states – i.e., manic, 
depressive, and euthymic? 
Literature Review 
 A systematic review of the literature was conducted utilising a Boolean 
search strategy based on the key criteria of ‘psychological condition’ (bipolar 
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disorder) and ‘information processing bias’ (attentional, interpretative, and 
memory).1 The search was conducted the last week of March, 2014 and was 
employed through OVID SP, PUBMED, and Web of Science databases. 
Articles were treated for inclusion in three stages: 1) titles and abstracts were 
reviewed to ascertain initial relevance, 2) potentially relevant articles were 
reviewed in full, and 3) data from the relevant qualifying articles were 
systematically extracted – Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Systematic review application of inclusion/exclusion and article 
selection. 
                                                          
1
 See Appendix A for full search string. 
2476 articles identified through database search 
837 duplicate articles excluded 
5 articles identified from  
included article references  
2 articles identified by authors 
of articles found by search 
28 articles met all inclusion/exclusion criteria 
9 articles excluded due to focus 
on cognitive impairment rather 
than processing bias 
4 articles excluded due to non-
clinical samples  
1602 did not meet 
inclusion/exclusion criteria at 
title and abstract review 
34 articles met inclusion/exclusion criteria at title 
and abstract review 
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Inclusion/exclusion Criteria 
 Inclusion/exclusion criteria were employed at each review stage to 
ensure relevance to the research questions – Table 1. 
Table 1 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria for Study Qualification in Review of Information 
Processing Biases in Bipolar Disorder 
Criteria 
category 
Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
  
Participant 1. Adult sample only (≥ 18 years or older) 
2. Male and female sample included 
3. Clinical level of bipolar disorder or mania 
a. Established either by clinician or diagnostic criteria 
(e.g., DSM) 
b. Not unipolar depression only 
c. Sub-syndromal only samples were excluded 
4. Bipolar or mania must be a discernible group 
differentiated from other mood disorders (i.e., not 
combined with other disorder like major or unipolar 
depression) 
5. Sample must not have a cognitive impairment (congenital 
or acquired) unrelated to bipolar or mania condition 
6. No case studies (n = 1) 
7. Each condition arm must contain n ≥ 10 at beginning of 
study 
Intervention 8. No intervention criteria as this was not the focus of the 
review 
Comparison 9. Studies must include a control comparison group 
10. Comparison groups of other psychological conditions will 
not be included in reviewed data 
Outcome 11. Study must include assessment of processing bias in: 
a. Attention 
b. Interpretation 
c. Or memory/recall 
12. Outcome must include task performance  to provide 
assessment of processing bias 
13. Outcome assessed by brain region activity (e.g. fMRI 
studies) alone will be excluded 
Additional 14. Articles must be published in a peer-reviewed journal 
15. English language publications only 
16. Conference abstracts and unpublished grey literature will 
be excluded 
17. No restrictions made on publication dates of articles 
included 
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Results 
Article Details 
Twenty-eight articles met inclusion/exclusion criteria. Study results were 
considered in terms of the three focal types of processing: 1) attention, 2) 
interpretation, and 3) memory. Results are stratified based on bipolar cycle 
state (i.e., manic, depressed, euthymic/remitted). 
Sample Details 
All but two studies (Lomax, Barnard, & Lam, 2009; Lomax & Lam, 2011) 
reported discrete samples. The total sample consisted of 809 control 
participants and 934 clinical participants – Table 2. The majority of studies 
reported a clinical sample of individuals with bipolar I disorder only (53.6%); four 
studies reported samples including bipolar I and II disorders; and seven did not 
specify the form of bipolar. One study reported including individuals with bipolar 
II, bipolar NOS, or cyclothymia (Molz Adams, Shapero, Pendergast, Alloy, & 
Abramson, 2014); and one study reported a manic or hypomanic sample 
(David, 1993). 
Control participants were commonly defined as having no personal or 
family history of psychiatric disorder. Four studies, however, did not define what 
constituted “healthy control” (David, 1993; Kronhaus et al., 2006; Lyon et al., 
1999; Thomas et al., 2009). 
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Table 2 
Demographic Information for Reviewed Studies 
      
Study Location Control participants  Bipolar participants  
         
  Number
†
 
Mean age in 
years (SD) 
Sex  
(% female) 
Total 
number
†
 
Number per 
condition 
Mean age in years 
(SD)
n 
Sex  
(% female) 
         
(Bermpohl et al., 2009) Germany 10 35.8 (12.9) 50% 10 BDM: 10 37.9 (13.2) 50% 
(Bermpohl et al., 2010) Germany 26 38.7 (13.7) 43% 22 BDD: 15  
BDE/R: 7
*
 
 BDM: 47% 
BDE/R: 57%  
(Bertocci et al., 2012) United States of 
America 
16 32.76 (6.5) 100% 18 BDD: 18 31.94 (8.54) 100% 
(David, 1993) United Kingdom 23 33.9 (6.3) 52% 10 BDM: 10 41.3 (12.9) 67% 
(Garcia-Blanco, Perea, & 
Livianos, 2013a) 
Spain 23 41.9 (10.7) 52.2% 80 BDM: 30 
BDD: 22 
BME/R: 28 
BDM: 39.1 (13.7) 
BDD: 44.1 (10.5) 
BDE/R: 42.7 (8.9) 
BDM: 33.3% 
BDD: 50% 
BDE/R: 32.1% 
(Garcia-Blanco, Perea, & 
Salmeron, 2013b)  
Spain 28 42.1 (12.4) 46.4% (13) 71 BDM: 25 
BDD: 22 
BDE/R: 24 
BDM: 42.5 (11.4) 
BDD: 49.1 (10.7) 
BDE: 40.6 (11.4) 
BDM: 44% 
BDD: 45.5% 
BDE: 37.5% 
(Garcia-Blanco, Salmeron, Perea, 
& Livianos, 2014) 
Spain 20 40.6 (13.4) 50% 66 BDM: 23 
BDD: 20 
BDE/R: 23 
BDM: 42.4 (12.1) 
BDD: 51.3 (10.2) 
BDE/R: 40.7 (10.7) 
BDM: 39.1% 
BDD: 45% 
BDE/R: 34.8% 
(Gopin, Burdick, DeRosse, 
Goldberg, & Malhotra, 2011) 
United States of 
America 
144 37.38 (12.88) 41% 59 BDE/R: 59 40.91 (11.98) 43% 
(Havermans, Nicolson, & deVries, 
2007) 
The Netherlands 38 44.94 (11.36) 60.5% 38 BDE/R: 38 46.2 (9.6) 50% 
(Holmes et al., 2011) United Kingdom 23 45.3 (12.2) 43% 23 BDE/R: 23 44.4 (11.8) 43% 
(Jabben et al., 2012) The Netherlands 61 45.3 (8.7) 62.3% 77  BDD: 17 
BDE/R: 60 
BDD: 46.4 (6.7) 
BDE/R: 43.9 (8.2) 
BDD: 47.1% 
BDE/R: 55.0% 
(Jongen, Smulders, Ranson, Arts, 
& Krabbendam, 2007) 
The Netherlands 29 
(CD: 16) 
(CE: 13)  
/ 
CD: 50 (7) 
CE: 44 (11) 
/ 
CD: 44% 
CE: 54% 
29  BDD: 16  
BDE/R: 13 
BDD: 48 (6) 
BDE/R: 43 (8) 
BDD: 44%  
BDE/R: 54% 
(Kronhaus et al., 2006) United Kingdom 11 36.4 (10.4) 45% 10 BDE/R: 10 40.9 (12.7) 40% 
(Kucharska-Pietura & David, 
2003) 
Poland 30 39.9 (12.2) / 30 BDM: 30 39.5 (14.1) 53.3% 
(Lennox, Jacob, Calder, Lupson, 
& Bullmore, 2004) 
United Kingdom 12 32.6 (10.7) 50% 10 BDM: 10 37.3 (12.8) 20% 
(Lex, Meyer, Marquart, & Thau, 
2008) 
Austria 19 48.1 (15.2) 53% 19 BDE/R: 19 39.7 (10.6) 63% 
(Lex, Hautzinger, & Meyer, 2011)
□
 Austria 21 43.43 (12.00) 62% 41  BDM: 15 BDM: 43.33 (12.18) BDM: 73% 
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BDE/R: 26 BDE/R: 49.35 
(11.20) 
BDE/R: 58% 
(Leyman, De Raedt, & Koster, 
2009) 
Belgium 14 46 (7.33) 43% 14 BDM: 14 46.36 (8.21) 43% 
(Lomax et al., 2009) United Kingdom 30 41.07 (14.98) 63% 30 BDE/R: 30 47.17 (11.67) 60% 
(Lomax & Lam, 2011) United Kingdom 30 41.07 (14.98) 63% 30 BDE/R: 30 47.17 (11.67) 60% 
(Lyon, Startup, & Bentall, 1999) United Kingdom 15 46.47 (14.74) 67% 30  BDM: 15 
BDD: 15 
BDM: 47.87 (18.06) 
BDD: 44.47 (13.16) 
BDM: 67%  
BDD: 60% 
(Malhi, Lagopoulos, Sachdev, 
Ivanovski, & Shnier, 2005) 
Australia 12 33.7 (12.4) 100% 12 BDE/E: 12 34.9 (9.1) 100% 
(Miklowitz, Alatiq, Geddes, 
Goodwin, & Williams, 2010) 
United Kingdom 20 29.6 (16.0) 50% 36 BDE/R: 36 40.8 (13.3) 61% 
(Molz Adams et al., 2014) United States of 
America 
58 19.53 (1.57) 
 
63% 66 BDE/R: 66 19.76 (1.89) 68% 
(Roiser et al., 2009) United Kingdom 19 35.4 (13.6) 19% 15 BDE/R: 15 44.4 (13.4) 67% 
(Strakowski et al., 2005) United States of 
America 
16 30 (9) 44% 16 BDE/R: 16 28 (7) 63% 
(Thomas, Bentall, Knowles, & Tai, 
2009) 
United Arab 
Emirates 
44 37.40 (12.70) 68% 55  BDM: 30 
BDD: 14  
BDE/R: 11 
BDM: 45.86 (12.45) 
BDD: 38.28 (7.81) 
BDE/R: 44.36 
(11.69) 
BDM: 67% 
BDD: 21% 
BDE/R: 64% 
(Wessa et al., 2007) France 17 44.94 (11.36) 35% 17 BDE/R: 17 44.94 (12.70) 41% 
       
TOTAL participant numbers Control  
group 
n = 809 
(M = 28.9; SD = 25.9) 
(52.8% female) 
Bipolar 
group  
n = 934  
(M = 33.4; SD = 22.4) 
(52.6% female) 
BDM: n = 227 
BDD: n = 144 
BDE/R: n = 563 
 
† Number of participants at start of study; *BDM group only discussed in review results as BDE/R group n < 10; 
n
 Age data provided for BDM, BDD, and BDE/R 
conditions where provided by reviewed article; 
□ 
BDM in this study comprised bipolar 1 participants currently experiencing hypomanic episode; BDM: Bipolar disorder – 
manic; BDD: Bipolar disorder – depressive; BDE/R: Bipolar disorder – euthymic/remitted; CD: Control participants matched to BDD participants; CE: Control participants 
matched to BDE/R participants.
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Assessment of Bipolar and Cycle State 
The majority of studies employed DSM-IV criteria in establishing clinical 
group diagnoses (85.7%). The oldest study employed DSM-III criteria (David, 
1993). One study employed the ICD-10 criteria only (Thomas et al., 2009). 
Diagnostic criteria were commonly assessed via standardised interview process 
(e.g., SCID-I; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) and/or psychiatrist. One 
study reported utilising an unspecified ‘standardised clinical interview’ (Lennox 
et al., 2004). In addition, most studies also included assessment of current 
depressive and manic state – Table 3. 
Table 3 
Commonly Employed Measures of Depression and Mania Level within 
Reviewed Articles 
Mood 
variable 
Measure Percentage of studies 
utilising measure 
Depression 1. Beck Depression Inventory (I or II) 
       (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & 
        Erbaugh, 1961; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) 
42.8% 
 2. Hamilton Rating Scale for Depression  
       (Hamilton, 1960)  
42.9% 
Mania 1. Young Mania Rating Scale  
       (Young, Biggs, Ziegler, & Meyer, 1978) 
57.1% 
 2. Altman Self-Rating Scale for Mania  
       (Altman, Hedeker, Peterson, & Davis, 1997) 
10.7% 
 3. Bech-Rafaelson Mania Scale  
       (Bech, Rafaelsen, Kramp, & Bolwig, 1978) 
7.1% 
NB: In evaluation of manic, depressive, and euthymic states, cut-off scores were inconsistent across 
studies. 
Assessment of Processing Bias 
All studies reported assessment of attention (n = 21), interpretation (n = 
11), and/or memory biases (n = 4) in individuals with bipolar disorder compared 
to controls – Table 4.  
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Table 4 
Summary of Article Methodologies and Results 
      
Study Type of 
processing 
assessed 
Task Dependent variable Stimuli Outcome 
      
(Bermpohl et al., 2009) Attention 
 
Interpretation 
Viewing images from 
International Picture 
System 
 
Attention 
Reaction time to 
photograph presentation 
Interpretation 
Interpretation of 
photograph valence 
Valenced photographs 
(Positive, negative, & 
neutral) 
Attention 
BDM = CL 
Interpretation 
BDM > CL on emotion valence ratings for positive 
and neutral photographs 
(Bermpohl et al., 2010) Attention Monetary Incentive 
Delay Task 
Reaction time Anticipatory cue and 
neutral target 
BDM = BDE/R = CL on reaction time 
(Bertocci et al., 2012) Attention Emotional face n-
back task 
 
Reaction time and 
response accuracy 
Response stimuli = 
letters; 
Distractor stimuli = 
valenced faces (neutral, 
fearful, happy) 
BDD = CL on reaction time and response accuracy 
(David, 1993) Attention Chimeric faces test;  
Lateralized Stroop 
test 
Reaction time Chimeric faces =  split 
sad/happy 
Stroop = coloured words 
BDM = CL on reaction times for chimeric faces and 
Stroop test 
 
(Garcia-Blanco et al., 
2013a)  
Attention Go/no go task Reaction time and 
response error 
Valenced words 
(positive & negative) 
BDM = BDD = BDE/R = CL on response error 
CL < BDM, BDD, BDE/R on time taken to respond 
(i.e. CL faster) 
BDM < on reaction time to positive than negative 
words (i.e., faster on positive) 
BDD < reaction time to negative than positive words 
(i.e., faster on negative) 
(Garcia-Blanco et al., 
2013b) 
Attention Prosaccade/ 
antisaccade task 
 
 
Eye-tracking; reaction 
time and response error 
Valenced faces (happy, 
sad & neutral) 
Antisaccade: (viewing away) 
BDM, BDD > BDE/R, CL on general response 
errors 
BDM > errors to happy faces than neutral or sad 
BDD approached > errors for sad face then neutral  
BDE, CL = no diff. in errors within groups 
BDM, BDD, BDE/R > CL on time taken to respond 
(i.e., slower than CL) 
Prosaccade: (viewing towards) 
BDM, BDD > BDE/R, CL on general response 
errors 
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(Garcia-Blanco et al., 
2014) 
Attention Viewing images from 
Internation Affective 
Picture System 
Eye-tracking; initial 
fixation, direction and 
duration of gaze 
Valenced images  
(happy, sad, neutral & 
threatening) split into 
quadrants  
BDD < CL on time viewing happy images 
BDM, BDD, BDE/R > CL on time spent viewing 
threatening images; and percentage of fixations 
BDD < CL on percentage of fixations on happy 
images  
(Gopin et al.,  2011) Attention 
 
Interpretation 
Go/no go task Reaction time and 
categorisation accuracy 
Valenced words (happy, 
sad & neutral) 
Attention 
BDE/R > CL response bias for negative words (not 
positive or neutral) 
Interpretation 
BDE/R < CL on accuracy for positive words (not 
negative or neutral) 
(Havermans et al., 
2007) 
Interpretation Experience Sampling 
Method 
Appraisal of life events 
across the day 
Appraisal of positive and 
negative events 
(pleasantness, 
stressfulness and 
importance) 
BDE/R = CL for appraisals of positive and negative 
events 
(Holmes et al., 2011) Interpretation Homograph 
Interpretation Task 
Valence of 
interpretations 
Valenced homographs 
(positive/negative) 
BDE/R < CL on positive interpretations 
BDE/R > CL on perceived vividness of positive 
images  
(Jabben et al., 2012) Attention Dot-probe task Reaction time 
(attentional bias score) 
Valenced words 
(positive, negative & 
neutral) 
BDD > BDE/R, CL attention away from positive 
words 
(Jongen et al., 2007) Attention Modified dot-probe 
task with spatial 
cueing 
Reaction time and 
response error 
Valenced word pairs 
(depression-neutral, 
positive-neutral, neutral-
neutral) 
BDD > BDE/R, CL bias away from both positive and 
negative word 
 
(Kronhaus et al., 2006) Attention Stroop test Response accuracy Coloured words BDE/R = CL on response accuracy 
(Kucharska-Pietura & 
David, 2003) 
Attention Chimeric faces Number of responses to 
either side of face 
Valenced faces 
(happy/sad split) 
BDM = CL on left-hemisphere bias 
(Lennox et al., 2004) Interpretation Facial recognition 
task 
Perceived valence 
intensity 
Valenced faces (happy 
& sad) 
BDM = CL for intensity rating of happy faces 
BDM < CL on intensity rating for the most sad faces 
(Lex et al., 2008) Attention 
 
Memory 
Attention 
Emotional Stroop 
test 
Memory 
Incidental recall task 
Attention 
Reaction time 
Memory 
Stimuli recall 
Valenced coloured 
words (positive mood, 
negative mood, neutral 
& non-words)  
Attention 
BDE/R = CL on response time 
BDE/R = CL both faster for neutral compared to 
positive and negative words 
Memory 
BDE/R = CL on recall irrespective of word valence 
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(Lex et al., 2011) Attention 
 
Memory 
Attention 
Emotion Stroop test 
Memory 
Emotional Auditory 
Verbal Learning Test 
(EMO-AVLT) 
Attention 
Reaction time 
Memory 
Stimuli recall 
Valenced words 
(depression-related, 
mania-related, & 
neutral) 
Attention 
BDM = BDE/R = CL for response time to words of 
different valences 
BDM > CL on response time to all words (i.e., BDM 
slower) 
BDE/R = CL on response time to all words 
Memory 
BDM < BDE/R, CL for learning (recall) of 
depression-related word 
BDE/R < BDM, CL on recognising words, 
irrespective of word valence 
(Leyman et al., 2009) Attention Dot-probe task with 
spatial cueing 
(200ms or 1000ms) 
Reaction time Valenced faces (happy, 
angry, neutral) 
Sig. effects for 200ms presentation only. 
BDM > CL on time taken to disengage from angry 
faces (i.e., BDM slower) 
(Lomax et al., 2009) Attention Question-answer 
task 
Level of pragmatic 
implication in response  
Ambiguous scenario 
statements 
BDE/R > CL on responses consistent with 
implication interpretation (i.e., assumed 
interpretation rather than factual) 
(Lomax & Lam, 2011) Interpretation Sentence-completion 
task 
Valence of completed 
sentence 
Valence ambiguous 
sentences 
(negative/dysfunctional 
and positive/functional) 
BDE/R > CL on negative/dysfunctional sentence 
completions 
(Lyon et al., 1999) Attention 
 
Interpretation 
 
Memory 
Attention 
Emotional Stroop 
test;  
Interpretation 
Self-reference 
incidental recall task 
(categorisation 
component) 
Memory 
Self-reference 
incidental recall task 
(recall component) 
Attention 
Reaction time 
Interpretation 
Categorisation of words 
as self-referential 
Memory 
Stimuli recall 
Valenced words 
(positive, negative & 
neutral) 
Attention 
BDM > CL on response time (i.e., BDM slower) 
BDM, BDD > interference on negative compared to 
positive words (CL demonstrate no difference) 
Interpretation 
BDM, CL > on endorsement of positive compared 
to negative words 
BDD > on endorsement of negative compared to 
positive words 
Memory 
CL > recall of positive than negative words 
BDM, BDD > recall of negative than positive words 
(Malhi et al., 2005) Attention Emotional Stroop 
test 
Reaction time and 
response error 
Valenced coloured 
words (positive, 
negative & neutral) 
BDE/R > CL on time to respond irrespective of word 
valence (i.e., BDE/R slower) 
BDE/R = CL on response errors 
(Miklowitz et al., 2010) Interpretation Scrambled-sentence 
task 
Number of 
positive/negative 
rearrangements 
Valenced sentences 
(hyperpositive, negative 
& neutral) 
BDE/R < CL on sentence completion in 
hyperpositive direction 
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(Molz Adams et al., 
2014) 
Interpretation 
 
Memory 
Interpretation 
Self-reference 
information 
processing task 
(categorisation 
component) 
Memory 
Self-reference 
information 
processing task 
(recall component) 
Interpretation 
Categorisation of 
adjectives as self-
referent  
Memory 
Adjective recall 
Valenced words 
(depression-related and 
–unrelated adjectives) 
Interpretation 
BDE/R < CL on endorsement of positive adjectives 
as self-referent 
BDE/R > CL on endorsement of negative adjectives 
as self-referent 
Memory 
BDE/R < CL on recall of positive adjectives 
BDE/R > CL on recall of negative adjectives 
(Roiser et al., 2009) Attention Go/no go task; 
following positive 
mood induction 
Reaction time and 
response error 
Valenced distractor 
words (positive and 
negative) 
BDE/R > commission errors to positive than 
negative distractor words 
CL did not 
No differences based on reaction time or omission 
errors 
(Strakowski et al., 2005) Attention Counting Stroop test Response error Numbers written as 
words 
BDE/R > CL on response error 
BDE/R < CL on percentage of correct responses 
(Thomas et al., 2009) Interpretation Sentence-completion 
task 
Valence of completed 
sentences 
Valenced possible 
sentences (positive and 
negative) 
BDM, BDD, BDE/R > CL on positive sentence 
completion 
BDM, BDE/R < CL on negative sentence 
completion (BDD not sig. different from CL) 
(Wessa et al., 2007) Attention Go/no go task Reaction time and 
response error 
Valenced faces (happy, 
fearful & neutral) 
BDE/R = CL on reaction time and response error 
for all face valences 
BDM: Bipolar disorder – manic; BDD: Bipolar disorder – depressive; BDE/R: Bipolar disorder – euthymic/remitted; CL: Control participants.
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The studies predominantly employed single-test lab-based designs. 
Seventy-one percent reported some evidence of processing biases in bipolar 
participants compared with controls. 2,3 
Attention 
Bipolar disorder-manic. Stroop test methodology (Stroop, 1935) 
demonstrated no significant difference between BDM and control participants in 
terms of attentional interference to neutral stimuli congruence, using either 
traditional (Lex et al., 2011) or lateralized4 presentation (David, 1993). 
Attentional interference was, however, less consistent with regard to emotional 
stimuli. Whereas Lex and colleagues (2011) found no evidence of attentional 
interference to more emotional stimuli (i.e., mania- and depression-related 
adjectives); elsewhere, slower responses to euphoria-related, compared to 
depression-related, words were reported in BDM individuals and not controls 
(Lyon et al., 1999). Accuracy of response-time measurement between these 
studies may be a factor in the discrepancy; computerised assessment utilised 
by Lex and colleagues (2011) is a more reliable assessment method than the 
researcher-controlled stopwatch employed by Lyon and colleagues (1999). 
These two studies were, however, consistent in finding a general slower 
response irrespective of stimuli valence in BDM compared to controls. Although 
one comparable image-response study did not find general slower task 
responses in BDM compared to controls (Bermpohl et al., 2009), this generic 
difference seems largely supported, as BDM participants were also found to 
                                                          
2
 Mood induction: Three studies included a mood induction task designed to elevate positive mood (Lomax et al., 
2009; Lomax & Lam, 2011; Roiser, Fanner, et al., 2009). Where pre and post assessment was conducted, pre mood 
induction results only are reported. Roiser et al. (2009) did not provide pre induction assessment; consequently, this 
is noted in text alongside the results. 
3
 Of the nine studies whose main focus was on brain imaging (e.g., fMRI) rather than task performance, only 55.6% 
reported significant evidence of task performance-based differences compared to 78.9% in studies only focused on 
task performance. This may demonstrate evidence of publication bias (Fanelli, 2010). 
4
 Traditional presentation involves presenting coloured words; Lateralized presentation involves presenting the 
colour and word separately on separate sides of a screen. 
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perform generally slower than controls to all stimuli in a go/no-go task (Garcia-
Blanco et al., 2013a) and averting gaze from photographs of faces irrespective 
of expression (Garcia-Blanco et al., 2013b). More specifically, in the go/no-go 
task, BDM demonstrated faster responses to positive compared to negative 
words, whereas controls demonstrated no stimuli-based performance 
differences, which may suggest quicker processing of positive over negative 
information in BDM. In terms of attentional inhibition, no difference in 
performance errors in the go/no-go task was found between groups; however, 
whereas controls demonstrated an expected shift-cost to changing task 
directions, BDM did not, which may demonstrate general difficulties in directed 
and inhibited attention control. Elsewhere, BDM individuals did make 
significantly more errors in averting attention from images of happy faces 
compared to sad and neutral faces (Garcia-Blanco et al., 2013b), which could 
suggest that type of stimuli as well as valence is important in specific, over 
general, attentional inhibition difficulties in BDM. 
Although the most commonly utilised methodology for assessing 
selective attention in the articles included in this review, no dot-probe 
procedures (MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986) involved BDM participants. One 
study did assess selective attention by eye-tracking during simultaneous 
presentation of differently valenced images (happy, sad, neutral, and 
threatening) in separate computer screen quadrants (Garcia-Blanco et al., 
2014). BDM participants spent more time attending to threatening images than 
controls, but otherwise demonstrated no valence-specific difference.  
Assessment of spatial attention was assessed through the emotional 
chimeric face test in two studies (David, 1993; Kucharska-Pietura & David, 
2003), in which participants categorise half-happy, half-sad faces as either
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happy or sad. The test is proposed to reveal hemispheric spatial bias – i.e., in 
right-handed individuals a left-hemispheric bias is expected. No significant 
differences in spatial bias, or bias towards sad/happy facial expressions, was 
found between BDM and controls in either study. 
One study explored the influence of cued task information prior to 
performance through the Monetary Incentive Delay Task (Bermpohl et al., 
2010). No evidence of performance differences between BDM and control was 
found that might suggest any altered attention or processing based on prior 
information. 
Finally, some inconsistent evidence of within-group differences5 was 
present. Garcia and colleagues (2013a) found faster BDM response times to 
positive compared to negative words. Whereas Lyon and colleagues (1999) 
also reported significantly more attentional interference to negative compared to 
positive words in BDM individuals; no difference between word valence was 
evident in controls.  
Bipolar disorder-depressed. There was relatively consistent evidence 
of attentional bias in response to valenced stimuli in BDD individuals compared 
to controls; away from positive stimuli and towards negative stimuli. BDD 
demonstrated within-group differences of faster task responses to negative 
compared to positive words (Garcia-Blanco et al., 2013a) and significant 
attentional interference for depression-related compared to euphoria-related 
words in a Stroop test (Lyon et al., 1999). Eye-tracking research demonstrated 
decreased attention towards happy images compared to controls and greater 
                                                          
5
 Within-group difference refers to different performance within the same cycle state (e.g., different 
response times to different stimuli valences within BDM participants, rather than in comparison with 
another group (i.e., control participants)). 
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time attending to threatening images (Garcia-Blanco et al., 2014). Relatedly, in 
a cued dot-probe assessment of attention, BDD participants demonstrated 
increased responsiveness to pre-probe cues in the form of angry faces (but not 
positive or neutral) and increased difficulty disengaging from these images, 
which may suggest increased attention to threat (Leyman et al., 2009). This 
effect was only present, however, for brief, 200ms presentations of face cues. 
Other dot-probe assessment has been less consistent. One study 
demonstrated increased attentional bias away from positive words in BDD 
compared to controls (Jabben et al., 2012), suggesting individuals with BDD 
may advert attention from positive stimuli. Whereas, another found only a 
general bias away from emotional word-based stimuli (both positive and 
negative) in BDD compared with controls; and no impact of pre-probe cueing 
(Jongen et al., 2007).  
In terms of attentional control, two studies suggested evidence of a 
generally impaired performance in BDD compared to controls. Garcia-Blanco 
and colleagues (2013a; 2013b) found slower tasks responses on the go/no-go 
task and increased task errors in specifically averting from, or directing attention 
to, images of faces, irrespective of stimuli valence. In the go/no-go task, BDD 
participants also demonstrated faster responses to negative compared to 
positive words; whereas controls did not differ in response. Contrastingly, 
however, Bertocci and colleagues (2012) found no differences between BDD 
and controls in inhibiting attention to neutral, fearful, or happy faces acting as 
distractors in an n-back task. 
Bipolar disorder-euthymic/remitted. Little evidence was found of 
differences between BDE/R and controls in terms of emotion-specific selective 
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attention or attentional interference. Both dot-probe assessment, utilising 
positive/negative/neutral word-based stimuli, (Jabben et al., 2012; Jongen et al., 
2007) and Stroop assessment, either utilising valenced (Lex et al., 2008; Malhi 
et al., 2005) or condition-related words (Lex et al., 2011), demonstrated no 
significant differences between BDE/R and controls. Notably, all studies utilised 
word, rather than image-based, stimuli; however,  eye-tracking technology has 
also suggested similar gaze fixation in BDE/R and controls for positive, negative 
and neutral valenced images (Garcia-Blanco et al., 2014) – although, as with 
BDM and BDD participants, increased attention to threatening images was 
demonstrated. 
Two studies employed neutral Stroop tests, assessing general rather 
than emotion-specific attentional interference between BDE/R and controls. The 
results were inconsistent – one study reported no significant differences in 
response accuracy between groups (Kronhaus et al., 2006) and one reported 
more errors in BDE/R participants (Strakowski et al., 2005). Relatedly, Malhi 
and colleagues (2005) did not replicate group difference in terms of errors, but 
did find generally slower responses rates in BDE/R compared to controls.  
In terms of attentional inhibition, go/no-go task results demonstrated 
inconsistent results. One study found evidence of bias towards negative stimuli; 
compared to controls, BDE/R demonstrated decreased reaction time to 
negative words and decreased response accuracy to positive words (Gopin et 
al., 2011). However, following positive mood induction, Roiser and colleagues 
(2009) found no difference in reaction time based on stimuli valence, although 
BDE/R participants did demonstrate significantly more commission errors when 
presented with positive rather than negative distractor words. Elsewhere 
differences in attention inhibition failed to be evidenced in either word-based 
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stimuli (Garcia-Blanco et al., 2013a) or using face distractors (Wessa et al., 
2007). 
Additionally, Lomax and colleagues (2009) suggested evidence of 
increased implicational processing in BDE/R compared to controls – i.e., that 
they were less likely to notice when an answer relied on expected outcome 
rather than on what could be factually ascertained from the question.  
Interpretation 
Bipolar disorder-manic. BDM was associated with interpretation biases 
in multiple forms. Two studies asked participants to interpret the emotional 
intensity of images, either faces (Lennox et al., 2004) or general images 
(Bermpohl et al., 2009). Both studies utilised standardised, validated image 
sets. In interpretation of facial expressions, whereas controls demonstrated 
good recognition of emotional intensity of both sad and happy faces, BDM 
participants demonstrated significantly lower ratings of emotional intensity for 
the most sad faces (Lennox et al., 2004). The authors suggest this may be 
evidence of reduced perception of sadness in BDM compared to controls. In 
rating general images rather than faces, this finding was not replicated exactly; 
instead, compared to controls, BDM gave higher emotional valence ratings for 
positive and neutral images, but not negative images (Bermpohl et al., 2009). 
Thomas and colleagues (2009) employed a sentence-completion task 
(Teasdale, Taylor, Cooper, Hayhurst, & Paykel, 1995) to assess differences in 
interpretation of sentences with both potential positive or negative meaning. 
Compared to controls, BDM participants made significantly more positive, and 
fewer negative, sentence completions. Relatedly, BDM individuals were found 
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to endorse more positive than negative words as self-referent; however, this 
pattern was also found in controls. 
Bipolar disorder-depressed. As with BDM individuals, Thomas and 
colleagues (2009) reported significantly more positive sentence completions in 
BDD compared to controls; however, unlike BDM, although BDD participants 
made fewer negative sentence completions than controls, this difference was 
not significant. No studies explored interpretation of images. 
Lyon and colleagues (1999) found that BDD participants endorsed more 
negative than positive words as self-referential; and that BDD individuals 
reported higher internalisation scores for negative compared to positive events, 
whereas BDM and control participants demonstrated the reverse. 
Bipolar disorder-euthymic/remitted. As with BDD, stimuli interpretation 
studies focused on language (word/sentence) interpretation and unfortunately 
did not include images. Conflicting evidence was found in terms of sentence-
completion task interpretation. Despite utilising the same sentence-completion 
methodology (Teasdale et al., 1995) across studies, BDE/R participants 
reportedly made significantly more negative interpretations (Lomax & Lam, 
2011) and significantly more positive interpretations compared to controls 
(Thomas et al., 2009). The latter difference was found for BDM, BDD, and 
BDE/R; however, only BDM and BDE/R made significantly fewer interpretations 
of ambiguous stimuli as negative compared to controls. Miklowitz and 
colleagues (2010) employed a scrambled-sentence task, such that each 
sentence could be resolved in a hyper-positive or –negative way. Controls 
made more hyperpositive interpretations compared to BDE/R participants. A 
further study employing homographs, with both positive and negative meaning, 
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found significantly fewer positive interpretations in BDE/R compared to controls 
(Holmes et al., 2011). BDE/R individuals also demonstrated more inaccuracies 
in correctly categorising emotionally positive words compared to controls, 
although no difference was found in accuracy of negative or neutral word 
interpretation (Gopin et al., 2011). BDE/R participants also demonstrated 
endorsement of significantly fewer positive words and more negative words as 
self-referent compared to controls (Molz Adams et al., 2014). This relationship 
was fully mediated by depressive symptoms. Consequently, although there is 
discrepancy between the sentence-completion studies; the overall evidence is 
most consistent with Lomax and Lam’s (2011) suggestion of a negative 
interpretational bias. 
Only one study incorporated real-world assessment. Havermans and 
colleagues (2007) explored subjective appraisals of life events across the day, 
but found no difference in perception of un/pleasantness, importance, or 
stressfulness between BDE/R and controls.  
Memory 
Bipolar disorder-manic. Two studies assessed memory bias in BDM 
(Lex et al., 2011; Lyon et al., 1999). In Lyon and colleagues’ (1999) study, BDM 
participants completed a simple recall task following the word endorsement task 
(see ‘interpretation’ section). They found BDM participants recalled significantly 
more negative words compared to controls (Lyon et al., 1999). Elsewhere, a 
more complex methodology was employed (an Emotional Auditory Verbal 
Learning Test) to assess ability to learning different valenced information 
(manic, depressive, and neutral) and the level of interference caused by new 
information (Lex et al., 2011). This methodology is a variation on standard 
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cognitive function assessment of immediate and briefly delayed recall, and 
concludes with a recognition task of included and not included words. Lex and 
colleagues (2011) reported BDM participants had greater difficulty recalling 
depression-related words after rehearsal compared to controls; however, no 
differentiating effects were found on the interference or recognition task. 
Bipolar disorder-depressive. Consistent with BDM, BDD was 
associated with significantly increased recall of negative words compared to 
controls (Lyon et al., 1999). 
Bipolar disorder-euthymic/remitted. Lex and colleagues (2008) found 
no significant difference in recall of difference valenced stimuli following Stroop 
test between BDE/R and controls. Similarly, no significant differences were 
found in recall following rehearsal, or after interference task; however, BDE/R 
participants recognised significantly fewer words than BDM and controls 
irrespective of word valence (Lex et al., 2011). Conflictingly, elsewhere, 
significantly greater recall of negative adjectives and reduced recall of positive 
adjectives was demonstrated in BDE/R compared to controls following a word 
endorsement task (Molz Adams et al., 2014). However, this study utilised 
relative proportion of adjectives as the outcome variable, rather than sum total, 
which compromises direct comparison with Lex and colleagues (2008). 
Discussion 
 Specific processing biases may be associated with specific psychological 
difficulties (Mogg & Bradley, 2005). This review demonstrates that in bipolar 
disorder, however, there is inconsistency, both in terms of the presence and 
form of bias. A clear profile of processing biases in bipolar disorder is not 
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currently forthcoming. Instead, the picture painted appears complex and 
variable – much like the condition itself.  
This review found little evidence of selective attention towards, and 
attentional interference in response to, different valenced stimuli in bipolar 
disorder in manic and euthymic states. This finding was irrespective of stimulus 
type (i.e. photograph or word), suggesting that even when processing images, 
which does not require the same level of semantic processing as words, 
specific propensities in allocation of attention are not evident in bipolar disorder. 
In contrast, depressive bipolar states present a more consistent pattern of 
selective attentional bias away from positive stimuli and towards negative. 
Evidence of difficulties employing attentional inhibition specific to 
valenced information was similarly inconsistent both across, and often within, 
bipolar states. Predominantly studies exploring attentional inhibition involved 
BME/R individuals, and it is here that there is most conflicting evidence – both 
supporting (e.g., Gopin et al., 2011; Roiser et al., 2009) and refuting (Garcia-
Blanco et al., 2013a; Wessa et al., 2007) valence-specific inhibition difficulties. 
Fewer studies exploring valence-specific inhibitions for other bipolar states were 
found. There was some evidence of speedier processing of valenced stimuli 
dependent on cycle state – i.e., faster response to positive compared to 
negative stimuli in manic states; and the converse for depressive states – but 
no evidence of task error indicative of valence-specific inhibition difficulties 
(Garcia-Blanco et al., 2013a). It is clear more research is needed across all 
states in order to more accurately conclude. 
More compelling support was found for associations between bipolar 
disorder and interpretation biases – although, once again, bias manifestation 
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was not entirely consistent. There is suggestion that manic states are 
associated with increased positive interpretations and/or diminished negative 
interpretations of ambiguous stimuli. However, evidence of the opposite 
negative bias in depressed states was inconsistent (Lyon et al., 1999; Thomas 
et al., 2009). Similarly, inconsistent biases towards both negative and positive 
interpretations were found for remitted and euthymic states. Although far from 
conclusive, it is interesting to observe that euthymic state potentially may not be 
considered a return to a ‘normal’ state, as cognitive vulnerabilities may remain. 
These results may also suggest that research should consider whether 
participants in euthymic states are stabilised in mood or currently descending or 
ascending in the bipolar cycle. 
Research into potential memory biases associated with bipolar disorder 
was the most lacking of the information processing biases investigated. Memory 
is a consistent component of cognitive functioning assessment (e.g., Cavanagh, 
Van Beck, Muir, & Blackwood, 2002; Hellvin et al., 2012); however, it appears 
that memory biases, rather than deficits, are under-researched. Consequently, 
the evidence suggesting a propensity to preferentially recall negative 
information was limited, as was comparison across cycle states.  
Methodological Considerations 
 Employment of validated diagnostic criteria was good across the majority 
of studies, enabling comparison of results; however, cycle state classification 
was less consistent. Although many studies employed validated measures of 
depression and mania to establish participants’ current cycle states, the 
measures used varied between studies, as did the cut-off criteria differentiating 
states. This inconsistency compromises comparison between studies.  
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Sample sizes were typically small. Consequently, statistical analyses will 
have frequently been underpowered. Once again, this limitation may have 
contributed to the inconsistent results between studies.  More positively, the 
majority of studies attempted to provide some assessment of equivalence 
between participant groups on variables outside of bipolar diagnosis (e.g., sex, 
age). 
The majority of studies employed validated tasks to assess bias. 
However, the potential impact of differences in stimuli and task modifications on 
outcome between studies must be acknowledged. This review highlights the 
need for replication of methodologies (Yong, 2012) to support the reliability of 
findings to refine the currently contradictory body of evidence. Furthermore, 
more ecologically valid evaluation is required. 
Limitations 
 This review has several limitations. Data for different cycle states of 
bipolar disorder were aggregated; however, as stated, the studies included did 
not employ entirely consistent state classification. Although their approaches 
were typically similar, the slight variation may compromise the unity of the 
results presented. The division of a disorder arguably considered spectral 
(Merikangas et al., 2011) may cause issues similar to the reduction of 
continuous data into categorical. Such reductive separation may be useful but 
must be considered with caution as the divisions are imposed. Finally, the 
review is limited to narrative discussion rather than meta-analysis given the 
heterogeneity of the methodologies and bias variables. Assessment of relative 
effect-sizes and reliability in future reviews would be expedient. 
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Conclusions 
This review indicates that there may be differences in the way individuals 
with bipolar disorder process information; however, a consistent profile is 
currently lacking. The inherent variability of bipolar disorder may mean that 
processing biases also vary. However, clarification of the inconsistent evidence 
is essential should consideration be turned to cognitive bias modification and 
bias-based therapy. Future research may utilise more dimensional conceptions 
of bipolar symptoms and employ longitudinal assessment of change within 
individuals throughout the bipolar cycle in order to determine a more coherent 
picture. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Search String 
1. “bipolar”  
2. “mania” 
3. #1 OR #2 
4. “processing bias*”  
5. “biased processing” 
6. #4 OR #5 
7. "attention bias*”  
8. “attentional bias*”  
9. “biased attention” 
10. #7 OR #8 OR #9 
11.  “interpret* bias*"  
12. "biased interpretation" 
13. #11 OR #12  
14. "memory bias*"  
15. "biased memory"  
16. "recall bias*"  
17. "biased recall" 
18. #14 OR #15 OR #16 OR #17 
19. #6 OR #10 OR #13 OR #18 
20. #3 AND #19 
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Abstract 
The speed and variability of thought are purportedly common features of 
specific psychological states, such as anxiety and mania. The present study 
explored the proposed independent and combinational influence of these 
variables upon condition-specific symptoms and affective state. A general 
population sample was recruited online (N = 263). Participants completed a 
thought speed and variability manipulation task, inducing a combination of 
fast/slow and varied/repetitive thought. Change in anxiety and mania symptoms 
was assessed through direct self-reported symptom levels and indirect, 
processing bias assessment (threat interpretation). Results indicated that both 
fast and varied thought independently increased self-reported manic symptoms. 
Affect was significantly less positive and more negative during slow thought. No 
change in anxiety symptoms or threat interpretation was found between 
manipulation conditions. Critically, no evidence for the proposed combinational 
influence of speed and variability was found. Implications for developing 
understanding of condition-specific mechanisms and avenues for therapeutic 
intervention are discussed.   
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The Impact of Thought Speed and Variability on Psychological State and 
Threat Perception 
Cognitive models of psychological difficulties, such as anxiety (Clark, 
1999) and mania (Mansell, Morrison, Reid, Lowens, & Tai, 2007), emphasise 
not only the role of what we think, but also how we think. Research into the 
relationship between how we think and such difficulties has often focused on 
the mechanisms and processing biases aligned with disorder-specific thought 
content (e.g., Alloy, Abramson, Walshaw, & Neeren, 2006; Mogg & Bradley, 
2005); however, recently suggestion has been made that characteristics of 
thinking, previous considered simply symptomatic, may directly contribute to 
specific difficulties, irrespective of the content of that thought (Pronin & Jacobs, 
2008).  
Mental Motion: A Theory of Thought Speed and Variability  
Mental motion conceptualises characteristics of thinking in terms of the 
movement-based attributes of thought speed and variability (Pronin & Jacobs, 
2008). Thought speed refers to the pace of thinking; whereas thought variability 
refers to the interconnectivity between thoughts – i.e., their uniqueness or 
repetitiveness. The mental motion account predicts condition-specific symptoms 
are causally related to the behaviour of these two characteristics of thought, 
both individually and in combination. Specific changes in thought speed and 
variability are proposed to cause changes in affective experience consistent 
with the conditions of depression, anxiety, and mania – Figure 1. Depressive 
states are predicted to be the result of slow, repetitive thought; whereas anxiety 
and mania share an increased thought speed, but are differentiated by thought 
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variability – anxiety predicted as involving repetitive thought, whereas mania 
involves varied. 
 
Figure 1. The proposed relationship between variables of mental motion 
(thought speed and variability) and psychological state. This diagram is taken 
from Pronin and Jacobs’ (2008) article summarising the mental motion account. 
The role of thought content in psychological difficulties is acknowledged; 
however, the characteristics of mention motion are proposed to exert an 
additional content-independent effect (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). The proposed 
effects of mental motion may be theorised as being evolutionarily 
advantageous: facilitating a state of mobilization and increased propensity 
towards action in emergency situations that induce quick thinking (Pronin, 
2013), and promoting learning and problem-solving through varied thinking by 
increasing positive affect (Bar, 2009). Conversely, depression, which is 
associated with slow ruminative thinking, has been hypothesised to encourage 
inactivity where action is counterproductive (Nesse, 2000).  
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The existing evidence, outlined below, illustrates that, while there is 
support for claims of a causal influence of these variables on psychological 
state, further empirical investigation is required to substantiate the proposed 
differentiating role of combined thought speed and variability in generating 
condition-specific symptoms. 
 Thought speed and psychological state. As stated, the speed at which 
a person thinks may be related to specific psychological difficulties; for instance, 
slower thought has been demonstrated in subclinical depression (Sadek & 
Bona, 2000) and faster thought is a feature of activation demonstrated in mania 
(Cassidy, Forest, Murry, & Carroll, 1998). Recent experimental designs have 
begun exploring the proposed causal influence of thought speed on 
psychological state; employing a wide range of methodologies to artificially 
manipulate thought speed. Manipulations have including pace-controlled 
reading, brain-storming, and speed of video presentation (Chandler & Pronin, 
2012; Pronin, Jacobs, & Wegner, 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006; Yang, 
Friedman-Wheeler, & Pronin, 2014). 
 There is consistent evidence from this research that thought speed 
influences affective state. In a series of six experiments, Pronin and colleagues 
(2008) employed a selection of manipulation procedures to increase or 
decrease participant thought speed. Consistently, fast thought was associated 
with higher levels of positive affect (PA) compared to slow; subscale analysis 
revealed increased feelings of elation and creativity, and frequently also 
increased felt energy. This effect on PA has been replicated in larger samples 
accounting for baseline levels of mood and depression, demonstrating both 
between and within-group difference for individuals without depression and 
those with mild-moderate depression; but not severe (Yang et al., 2014). 
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Interestingly, differences in negative affect (NA) have infrequently demonstrated 
association with thought speed, even slow thought (Pronin et al., 2008; Yang et 
al., 2014). 
In addition to affective experience, thought speed has been associated 
with behavioural differences. Participants manipulated to think fast have 
demonstrated increased pressure of speech and resistance to interruption 
compared to slow thought conditions (Pronin et al., 2008). Furthermore, in an 
investigation exploring risk-taking behaviour following thought speed 
manipulation, fast thought speed was associated with both greater current, and 
intended future, risk-taking compared to slow thought (Chandler & Pronin, 
2012). These behaviours were associated with diminished expectation of 
negative consequences for the proposed risk-taking, yet no increased 
anticipated likelihood of positive outcomes.  
Limited empirical investigation into anxiety and thought speed exists. 
Preliminary investigation has demonstrated association between anxiety and 
thought over-activation (Keizer et al., 2014); however, over-activation 
encompasses other attributes, such as thought crowdedness, as well as speed. 
Consequently, the proposition that increased thought speed is associated with 
anxiety, consistent with a threat-response state of activation, appears 
predominantly theoretical (Pronin, 2013; Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). Furthermore, 
as will be discussed, the mental motion account stresses that anxiety may be 
best understood in relation to combined thought speed and variability, rather 
than thought speed alone. 
Collectively, this evidence suggests that thought speed may influence 
both affective state and behaviour. Manipulation into fast thought may generate 
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changes consistent with emotional and behavioural features of manic symptoms 
(Pronin & Wegner, 2006). Thought speed also influences affective state; 
however, this influence is most consistently apparent in PA rather than NA. 
Consequently, although there is evidence that fast thought may change PA in 
those experiencing mild-moderate depression (Yang et al., 2014), there is not 
yet confirmation that slow thought is causally related to depression. 
Furthermore, existing research on thought speed is limited by the relative lack 
of baseline assessment in methodologies employed. Evidence is predominantly 
limited to cross-sectional investigation of between-group differences, with few 
studies attending to within-group change pre/post manipulation (e.g., Pronin et 
al., 2008 – study six; Yang et al., 2014). 
 Thought variability and psychological state. Associations between 
thought variability (or repetitiveness) and psychological state has received 
considerably more investigation than thought speed – although, as emphasised 
by Watkins (2008), the literature is fragmented by research fields and 
terminology.  
A thought may bear varying degrees of resemblance and connectivity to 
prior thoughts, in terms of literal repetition and related conceptual themes. 
Ruminative thinking is most commonly associated with depression, and has 
been demonstrated to be elevated in those experiencing dysphoric mood (Riso 
et al., 2003; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 1998), and predictive of depression (Just 
& Alloy, 1997). However, anxiety is also associated with rumination (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000), as well another form of repetitive thought – worry.  Although 
rumination and worry appear related (Segerstrom et al., 2000), differentiation in 
terms of their foci and content has been suggested (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). Both rumination and worry have demonstrated some evidence of causal 
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relation with depression and anxiety, respectively. Studies inducing these forms 
of repetitive thought have found that rumination, compared to distraction, 
increases depression levels in those with existing depression (Nolen-hoeksema 
& Morrow, 1993); and worry increases NA (McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 
2007).  
The concept and form of repetitive thought extends beyond rumination 
and worry; in an extensive review, Watkins (2008) considered not only the 
various forms of repetitive thought, but also their potential adaptive functions. In 
addition to the well-documented unconstructive consequences, repetitive 
thought may aid problem-solving, focus emergency response, and facilitating 
emotional processing. Watkins suggested that structural (e.g., content valence) 
and processing (e.g., concrete vs. abstract) features of repetitive thought may 
differentiate outcome.  
In an experimental manipulation of the breadth of associations between 
thoughts, Mason and Bar (2012) allocated participants to read either a series of 
narrowly associated (i.e., revolving around a narrow topic) or broadly 
progressive words (i.e., related but developing in thematic focus from one to the 
next). Narrow associative thinking led to decreased PA; whereas, broad 
progressive thinking led to decreased NA. It has been suggested that changes 
in affect induced by thought variability may constitute an innate reward system 
encouraging associative thinking as a means of facilitating learning and survival 
(Bar, 2009). 
Others have suggested that the process of thought repetition may impact 
on the individual’s experience, irrespective of content. In a pace-controlled 
reading task, Pronin and Jacobs (2008) manipulated both thought speed and 
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thought variability in 74 participants. The manipulation involved reading a 
sequence of neutral trivia statements that either did, or did not, repeat. 
Statements were presented at either half or twice normal reading speed. 
Compared to the repetitive thought condition, varied thought was associated 
with significantly higher levels of PA and near significantly higher levels of 
perceived energy. This study provides the only investigation of the potential 
interactive properties of thought speed and variability, which the mental motion 
account proposes play a differentiating role in determining specific 
psychological states (e.g., anxiety, mania, and depression). Although no 
interactive effect of thought speed and variability was demonstrated on PA or 
NA; the results demonstrated that repetitive thought was associated with more 
feelings of depression than anxiety when slow; and with more feelings of 
anxiety than depression when fast. The latter thinking style also predicted 
higher levels of felt energy. These results provide some support for the 
proposed interactive role of mental motion variables; however, further 
investigation is warranted for several reasons: 1) the small sample size for the 
reported analyses, 2) with the exception of assessment of felt energy, 
differentiation between symptoms of anxiety and mania was largely unexplored, 
3) the study did not report using validated measurement of condition symptoms; 
and 4) the reported significant interaction effects related to differences between 
levels of anxiety and depression rather than within each condition – such effects 
may consequently be largely driven by change in one condition rather than 
both. 
The reviewed evidence provides some support for the mental motion 
account. Related characteristics of thought have been associated with 
depression (e.g., Segerstrom et al., 2000), anxiety (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 
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2000), and mania (e.g., Pronin & Wegner, 2006). Of the two highlighted 
characteristics of thought, variability/repetition appears to have received the 
greatest empirical investigation (e.g., see Watkins, 2008). Investigation of 
thought speed appears largely limited to one research group (i.e., Pronin and 
colleagues). However, the proposed interactive influence of thought speed and 
variability has only received limited investigation. In particular, the potential 
differentiating role of thought variability in generating anxious and manic states 
is largely untested. It is an interesting proposition as both anxiety and mania 
can be conceptualised as states of activation. In anxiety, activation is 
associated with the sympathetic nervous system (Waugh & Grant, 2006) in 
preparation for ‘fight or flight’ threat response; whereas in mania, activation is 
associated with approach towards, and responsiveness to, potential reward 
(Johnson, Edge, Holmes, & Carver, 2012). Anxiety and mania may, therefore, 
be related to increased sensitivity of biopsychological systems designed to 
respond to potential punishment (Behavioural Inhibition System; Gray & 
McNaughton, 2000) and reward (Behavioural Activation System; see Johnson 
et al., 2012 for review), respectively. Consequently, the activation states of 
anxiety and mania may be distinguished by purpose of mobilization – i.e., 
avoidance or approach. Whether mental motion plays a role in respective 
system activation is yet to be determined; however, before this question can be 
addressed, the more fundamental question of whether mental motion 
demonstrates the predicted causal relation with specific psychological states 
characterising anxiety and mania requires further attention. 
Present Study 
The present study aimed to extend previous research into thought speed 
and thought variability, and their proposed causal relationship with symptoms of 
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specific psychological states – namely anxiety and mania. In particular, this 
study was concerned with the independent influence of these variables when 
controlling for the emotional valence of thought content. As affective experience 
has frequently been included in previous research and has provided relatively 
consistent evidence, assessment of changes in affect was also included in the 
present study to enable comparison with existing evidence. As a nascent area 
of research, investigation of manipulation effects and symptom variation was 
limited to the general population, rather than clinical sample. The research was 
conducted online to facilitate access to a relatively diverse population and 
recruit a sufficient sample size for well-powered investigation. Online 
experimental methods are both empirically supported (Germine et al., 2012) 
and have been previously been utilised for thought speed manipulation (Yang et 
al., 2014).  
The study employed validated clinical self-report measures of condition 
symptoms. Furthermore, although there have been instances of behavioural 
assessment of condition symptoms (e.g., Chandler & Pronin, 2012), previous 
studies have predominantly relied solely on self-report symptom assessment. 
There is a need for inclusion of more objective symptom assessment as well as 
self-reported symptoms. Processing biases have been suggested to be 
instrumental in the maintenance of psychological difficulties (e.g., Clark, 1999) 
and differentiable between conditions (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2005). In anxiety 
for instance, processing biases commonly present as unconscious, 
uncontrollable propensities towards threat perception (Teachman, Joormann, 
Steinman, & Gotlib, 2012), even in its absence. Consequently, this study 
included assessment of condition-specific threat interpretation bias as an 
additional more objective assessment of condition symptoms. As there is 
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discrepant evidence of both decreased sensitivity to threat (Carver & Johnson, 
2009) and increased attention towards threat in mania (Garcia-Blanco, 
Salmeron, Perea, & Livianos, 2014), this study component was exploratory but 
aimed to provide primarily investigation whether manipulation of mental motion 
causes differences in perception as well as psychological state. 
Finally, whereas previous studies manipulating thought speed have 
predominantly evaluated cross-sectional between-group differences, this study 
aimed to extend the limited experimental investigation of change across time 
points. Based on theory and evidence outlined, the following primary and 
secondary research questions were developed: 
Primary research question. Do specific combinations of thought speed 
and variability cause an increase in condition-specific symptoms of anxiety and 
mania?  
Hypothesis one. Based on the mental motion account, it was predicted 
that increased thought speed would lead to increased self-reported levels of 
anxiety symptoms particularly when thought is repetitive and increased self-
reported levels of manic symptoms particular when thought is varied. 
Furthermore, if specific mental motion, as outlined in hypothesis one, 
causes increased condition-specific symptoms of anxiety and mania, it was 
hypothesised that changes in information interpretation consistent with the 
respective conditions would also be evident. 
Hypothesis two.  As anxiety is associated with increased threat 
perception (Mogg & Bradley, 2005), it was predicted that fast, repetitive thought 
would be associated with increased levels of threat interpretation.  
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Hypothesis three. Symptoms of mania demonstrate inconsistent 
association with decreased threat sensitivity (Carver & Johnson, 2009). 
Consequently, it was tentatively predicted that fast, variable thought would be 
associated with decreased levels of threat interpretation.  
Secondary research question. Do specific manipulations of thought 
speed and variability cause changes in affect consistent with previous research 
findings? 
Hypothesis four. Based on previous research, it was predicted that 
faster and more variable thought, respectively, would be associated with higher 
level of positive affect. 
Hypothesis five. Based on the mental motion account, it was predicted 
that slower and more repetitive thought, respectively, would be associated with 
higher levels of negative affect. However, it was acknowledged that previous 
research has inconsistently demonstrated significant association between 
negative affect and these variables. 
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Materials and Methods 
Participants 
Participants comprised an opportunity sample from the general 
population. Participants were only included if aged ≥ 18 years old. Two hundred 
and sixty-three participants comprised the final sample post data screening.6 
Participants were recruited through online advertising – i.e., study databases, 
social network websites, forums, and emails were sent to UK universities with ≥ 
25,000 students requesting the advert be circulated. A subsection of 
participants (n = 78) were recruited through the university online participant pool 
and awarded course credit for participation – differences between this 
subsection and remaining participants is considered in the results section. 
Participant demographic characteristics are summarised in Table 1. 
  
                                                          
6
 Sample size exceeded the number required for proposed analyses; see Appendix C1 for power 
calculation. 
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Table 1 
Participant Demographic Information 
Characteristic  % (unless specified) 
Sex   
 Male 27.4 
 Female 72.6 
Age   
 Mean (SD) 27.4 years (11.2) 
 Range 51.4 years 
Marital status   
 Single 52.9 
 In a couple, not married 27.0 
 Married 16.3 
 Divorced 2.7 
 Widowed 1.1 
Ethnicity   
 White 85.6 
 Chinese 4.2 
 Other 10.2 
Country   
 UK 62.7 
 USA 25.1 
 Canada 4.2 
 Other 8 
First language   
 English 89 
 Other 29 
Employment status   
 Full-time employed 22.4 
 Part-time employed 6.8 
 Full-time student 58.9 
 Part-time student 1.5 
 Unemployed 7.6 
 Do not work due to disability 1.1 
 Retired 1.5 
Diagnosis of mental 
health difficulties 
  
 No 72.6 
 Depression 16 
 Anxiety 7.2 
 Bipolar disorder .8 
 Other 3.4 
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Measures7 
Assessment of manic symptoms. Self-report of manic symptoms was 
assessed on two levels: 1) trait symptom levels evaluating baseline mania 
vulnerability for sample descriptive purposes, and 2) state symptom levels 
evaluating predicted changes in manic symptoms pre/post experimental 
manipulation. 
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). 
Trait manic symptoms were measured by the HPS. The HPS is a 48-item 
measure of hypomanic personality; evaluating trait vulnerability towards mania. 
Items are rated true or false. It has demonstrated good internal (Cronbach’s α = 
.87) and test-rest (α = .81) reliability. In terms of construct validity, Eckblad and 
Chapman’s (1986) original validation study demonstrated association between 
hypomania vulnerability, assessed by the HPS, and experience of hypomanic 
episodes. A 13-year follow-up assessment of the same participants further 
demonstrated that higher HPS scores at initial assessment were associated 
with increased likelihood of development of bipolar disorder at follow-up (Kwapil 
et al., 2000). 
Internal State Scale (ISS; Bauer, Vojta, Kinosian, Altschuler, Glick, 
2000). State manic symptoms were assessed using the ISS. The ISS includes 
15-items comprising four subscales: activation, well-being, depression, and 
perceived conflict. Participants endorse items based on 0-100% agreement 
scale. All subscales have good internal consistency (α = .81 to .92). This study 
utilised activation (5 items) and wellbeing (3 items) subscales only. Instructions 
                                                          
7
 The Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (CFQ; Gillanders et al., 2014) was also employed as a baseline 
measure; however, it is not reported here as it is intended for report in a separate paper and is not 
relevant to the specified thesis research questions. 
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were modified to assess current state, rather than last 24 hours – this 
modification has been employed elsewhere (e.g., Taylor & Mansell, 2008).  
ISS: activation was selected as a measurement of state manic symptoms 
as activation has been proposed to be a common and core factor underpinning 
the range of manic symptoms (see Mansell and Pedley (2008) for discussion); 
and the subscale correlates positively with clinical assessment of mania.8 
Additionally, in combination with the wellbeing subscale, the activation subscale 
provides dichotomous categorisation of mood state for (hypo)manic, mixed 
state, euthymic, and depressive states, respectively (Bauer et al., 2000). 
Assessment of anxiety symptoms. Self-report assessment of anxiety 
symptoms was also measured at trait and state levels, respectively assessing: 
1) descriptive information regarding sample vulnerability, and 2) predicted 
change in anxiety symptoms across experimental manipulation. 
State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety (STICSA; 
Grös, Antony, Simms, & McCabe, 2007).9 Trait anxiety symptoms were 
measured by the STICSA. The STICSA is a 21-item measure of anxiety, 
capable of assessing state and trait anxiety, respectively – the trait assessment 
was used in this study. It incorporates cognitive and somatic anxiety subscales, 
and a composite total. Participants endorse likert-scale items based on level of 
agreement with each statement (1 = not at all; 4 = very much so). The STICSA-
trait measure reportedly demonstrates good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α 
= .87 for both subscales); convergent validity through strong positive correlation 
with other anxiety measures (Grös et al., 2007); and greater discriminating 
                                                          
8
 r = .60 with the Young Mania Rating Scale (Young, Biggs, Ziegler, & Meyer, 1978) – reported in Bauer et 
al., 2000. 
9
 Original STICSA validation published in conference presentation (Ree, MacLeod, French, & Locke, 2000 
as cited in Grös et al., 2007, p. 370.) 
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validity than Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Elwood, Wolitzky-Taylor, 
& Olatunji, 2012). 
Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – short-form (STAI-sf; 
Marteau & Bekker, 1992). State anxiety symptoms were assessed using the 
STAI-sf. The STAI-sf is a six-item short-form of the original STAI (Spielberg, 
Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Participants endorse item (e.g., I 
feel calm) on a 4-point likert-scale (1 = not at all; 4 = very much). Authors report 
good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .82) and comparability to the full 
STAI. Compared to alternative short-form versions, the selected measure 
demonstrates the best reliability and validity in correlation with the full STAI 
(Tluczek, Henriques, & Brown, 2009). 
 Assessment of affective state. State PA and NA were assessed to 
explore predicted changes in affect across experimental manipulations. 
Standardised measurement was utilised at baseline for descriptive information 
about the sample; however, brief single-item assessments were preferred for 
repeated measurement pre/post manipulation to reduce task burden whilst 
assessing predicted change. 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988). The PANAS is a 20-item measure of PA and NA. Item are 
endorsed on the extent they relate to present mood on a 5-point likert-scale (1 = 
very slight or not at all; 5 = extremely). Authors report good internal consistency 
(PA, α = .89; NA, α = .85) and construct validity through correlation with 
depression and anxiety measures. 
 Brief mood items. Single-item assessments of PA and NA, respectively, 
were included for brief mood assessment. Participants rated an item on the 
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positivity and negativity of current mood, respectively, on a 0-100% scale. Items 
were correlated with PANAS assessment to evaluate their validity as mood 
assessments (Table 2). 
Table 2 
Measure Internal Reliability Statistics for Current Study 
    
Assessment focus Measure Measure purpose Cronbach’s α (present study) 
    
Manic symptoms HPS Trait mania vulnerability;  
Baseline assessment 
α = .89 
 ISS: activation State manic symptoms; 
Pre/post manipulation change 
α = .82 
    
Anxiety symptoms STICSA Trait anxiety vulnerability; 
Baseline assessment 
α =. 92 
 STIA-sf State anxiety symptoms; 
Pre/post manipulation change 
α = .86 
    
Affect PANAS PA and NA; 
Validated baseline assessment 
PA: α = .9 
NA: α = .87 
 Single mood 
items 
PA and NA; 
Pre/post manipulation change 
PA correlated with PANAS-PA, 
r (261) = .43, p < .001,  
NA correlated with PANAS-NA, 
r (261) = .54, p < .001 
STICSA: cognitive subscale Cronbach’s α = .88, somatic subscale Cronbach’s α = .85; ISS: wellbeing 
Cronbach’s α = .78 for the present study; PANAS correlations one-tailed.  
 Assessment of threat interpretation. Threat interpretation was 
assessed pre/post experimental manipulation to evaluate predicted changes 
following experimental manipulation. 
 Ambiguous Scenarios Test (AST; Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
The AST was employed to assess the predicted changes in threat 
interpretation. The test consists of 20 short threat-ambiguous scenarios – 10 
pre and 10 post manipulation. For each scenario, participants are presented 
with two sentences providing differing interpretation of the scenario – one 
threatening and one neutral interpretation. Participants then rated both 
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interpretations on a 4-point likert scale in terms of how similar to the meaning of 
the scenario they thought each statement was (1 = very different in meaning; 4 
= very similar in meaning). Within this study only the threat ratings are 
employed in the analyses as this data relates most specifically to the research 
question. Consistent with previous AST methodology, scenarios in each set of 
10 were presented in the same order and the sets counterbalanced between 
participants (Hoppitt, Mathews, Yiend, & Mackintosh, 2010). 
 Engagement and technical difficulties questions. Items evaluating 
participant engagement and any technical difficulty during completion were 
included for data screening purposes. 
Manipulation 
 The thought speed and thought variability manipulations replicated 
Pronin and colleagues’ methodology (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 
2006). A 2x2 factorial design was employed; thought speed (fast/slow) X 
thought variability (varied/repetitive). Participants were allocated to one of these 
four manipulation conditions. In each condition, participants read 63 neutral 
statements presented in a video produced using Microsoft Powerpoint. Thought 
speed was manipulated by speed of statement presentation; either fast (40ms 
per letter) or slow (170ms per letter).10 The interval between statements was 
320ms in the fast condition and 4,000ms in the slow condition. Thought 
variability was manipulated by presenting either a non-repeating sequence of 63 
neutral statements (varied thought) or presenting the same three statements 21 
times (repetitive thought). Multiple versions of the repetitive condition, with 
                                                          
10
 Pronin & Wegner (2006) report the fast thought speed manipulation as approximately twice the 
normal rate of reading; and the slow thought speed manipulation as approximately half the normal rate. 
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different sets of three statements, were employed across participants to prevent 
content effects.11 
 Thought speed manipulation check. To assess change in perceived 
thought speed resultant from the experimental manipulation, a single-item 
utilised by Pronin and Wegner (2006) was employed. The item requested 
participants rate their current speed of thought on a 9-point likert-scale (1 = very 
slow; 9 = very fast) – wording was modified to enable repeated employment 
pre/post manipulation. 
Procedure 
 Ethical approval was awarded by the departmental ethics committee. 
Participants completed the study online. Following informed consent, 
participants completed demographic details and baseline questionnaires – the 
order of the latter was randomised. Participants then completed the pre-
manipulation AST before being allocated to one of four manipulation conditions. 
Allocation to manipulation condition was determined by the pseudorandom 
number generator12 function of the online study software (qualtrics.com), which 
guarantees relatively equal numbers between conditions. Post-manipulation 
questionnaires and AST were then administered. Thought speed was assessed 
at four points across the course of the study – Figure 2. 
  
                                                          
11
 Full details on manipulation statements and control of presentation order effects is detailed in 
Appendix B12. 
12
 This randomisation algorithm is the Mersenne Twister. 
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Figure 2. Experimental design and procedural flow.  
Baseline assessment 
1) Trait measurement:    2) State measurement: 
a. Mania (HPS)     a. Mania (ISS) 
b. Anxiety (STICSA)    b. Anxiety (STAI-sf)  
       c. Mood (PANAS + mood items) 
Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 1) 
Thought speed and content manipulation 
Pseudo-randomised allocation 
Condition four 
Fast thought speed 
Repetitive content 
(n = 64) 
Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 2) 
Post manipulation assessment 
State measurement: 
a. Mania (ISS) b. Anxiety (STAI-sf) c. Mood (mood items) 
Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 3) 
Threat interpretation assessment 
Counterbalanced presentation order 
Condition three 
Slow thought speed 
Repetitive content 
(n = 63) 
Condition two 
Fast thought speed 
Variable content 
(n = 70) 
Condition one 
Slow thought speed 
Variable content 
(n = 66) 
AST 
Block two 
AST 
Block one 
Threat interpretation assessment 
Counterbalanced presentation order 
AST 
Block one 
AST 
Block two 
Thought speed assessment (Assessment point 4) 
Engagement & technical difficulties questions 
Relaxation task followed by participant debrief 
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The study concluded with engagement and technical difficulties 
questions and a relaxation video aimed to counter any residual effects of the 
manipulation. Participants were then provided with a full study debrief. A pilot 
study (N = 10) conducted prior to the main study confirmed the acceptability of 
this design.13 
Data Screening and Reduction  
 Online research typically increases the potential for large quantities of 
incomplete data, technical difficulties, and potential noise. However, these 
considerations do not have to compromise the quality of the final data set or 
findings (Germine et al., 2012) and can be accounted for by strict data 
screening. Consequently, the original data set (N = 603) was screened and 
reduced to include participants who completed all study components within 
specific time parameters (e.g., no longer than 1 ½ hours; and remained on the 
manipulation video webpage for a set minimum time period).14 To reduce the 
influence of extreme data points, dependent variables were assessed for 
outliers, which were replaced using the Winsorising approach.15 
Statistical Analyses 
 Data were analysed using SPSS statistics 20. Parametric analyses were 
conducted as assumptions of normality were met according to central limit 
theorem (each group N ≥ 30); alongside chi-square tests and logistic regression 
for categorical variables. For the purposes of analyses, effects coding16 was 
employed for both thought speed (slow = -1; fast = 1) and thought variability 
                                                          
13
 Full details of pilot study and participant responses are detailed in Appendix C2. 
14
 Full data screening and reduction methods are detailed in Appendix C3. 
15
 Outliers were defined as data points ≥ 75 percentile + 1.5xInterquartile range; and ≤ 25 percentile – 
1.5xInterquartile range. Outliers were replaced with the nearest acceptable non-outlying data point. 
16
 Effects coding (i.e., -1, 1) was preferred over dummy coding (i.e., 0, 1) as there was no control 
condition as appropriate contrast. 
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(repetitive = -1; varied = 1). Model assumptions and fit were assessed for all 
analyses (e.g., Levene’s test); where evidence of poor fit was detected and 
could not be rectified through data transformation, this is reported alongside the 
results. With the exception of sample descriptive information, all means 
reported are estimated means. 
Results 
Baseline Descriptive Information and Comparisons17 
 Sample descriptive information for all measures was compiled – Table 3. 
Table 3 
Baseline Raw Data Descriptive Information for Total Sample and Stratified by 
Manipulation Condition 
   
 Manipulation condition: 
Thought Speed X Thought Variability 
 
Mean variable 
score (SD) 
 
Slow, repetitive 
 
Slow, varied 
 
Fast, repetitive 
 
Fast, varied 
 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
      
HPS 16.35 (9.50) 15.76 (8.23) 16.58 (8.53) 16.59 (7.60) 16.32 (8.42) 
STICSA 39.24 (10.98) 38.09 (11.77) 38.98 (10.12) 39.34 (11.25) 38.92 (11.01) 
STAI-sf 12.21 (3.92) 11.36 (4.02) 11.63 (4.10) 12.80 (4.05) 12.01 (4.04) 
ISS: activation 127.84 (103.23) 122.02 (86.35) 142.06 (104.44) 116.16 (88.04) 126.73 (95.55) 
ISS: wellbeing 146.19 (67.46) 157.26 (60.80) 167.59 (64.72) 148.11 (57.18) 154.69 (62.72) 
PANAS PA 24.32 (8.50) 26.67 (8.74) 25.72 (8.12) 24.26 (7.27) 25.23 (8.18) 
PANAS NA 15.10 (4.66) 15.61 (5.24) 15.53 (5.29) 15.87 (5.26) 15.54 (5.10) 
Single-item PA 61.27 (21.57) 67.23 (23.53) 65.84 (22.38) 59.29 (22.87) 63.35 (22.73) 
Single-item NA 29.76 (23.75) 25.26 (22.67)* 30.94 (22.44) 37.36 (26.09)* 30.94 (24.10) 
AST Threat 20.76 (5.41) 21.59 (5.92) 21.22 (5.85) 21.51 (6.47) 21.28 (5.91) 
* Tukey’s post-hoc analysis revealed that variable slow and variable fast manipulation conditions 
significantly differed at baseline on single-item NA, M = 12.10 95% CIs [1.53, 22.67], SE = 4.09, p = .018. 
                                                          
17
 Baseline comparisons of study completers versus non-completers are detailed in Appendix D1. 
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To assess the equivalence of participants between conditions, baseline 
comparisons were conducted between the manipulation conditions outline in 
Table 1. Between-groups univariate ANOVAs were employed to investigate 
baseline differences between the four conditions. A separate ANOVA was 
conducted for the each of the following continuous demographic and dependent 
variables: age, self-reported thought speed, trait anxiety symptoms (STICSA) 
and mania vulnerability (HPS), state anxiety symptoms (STAI-sf), mood 
(PANAS and single mood items), state mania symptoms (ISS: activation), state 
wellbeing (ISS: wellbeing), and level of threat interpretation (AST).18 Univariate 
tests demonstrated no difference between experimental conditions on these 
measures (Fs ≤ 1.84, ps ≥ .141), with the exception of single-item NA, F(3, 
259), p = .031, ηp
2 = .03 – Table 3. However, baseline scores were accounted 
for in all subsequent analyses of these dependent variables, including NA, 
either as covariate or repeated-measures design; consequently, this finding did 
not compromise the following results. 
Comparison between experimental conditions on categorical baseline 
variables (Table 1) was explored through chi-squared tests. Only variables of 
participant sex and whether participant’s first language was English fulfilled the 
test requirements.19 No difference was demonstrated in participant sex, X2(3) = 
.70, p = .874; difference in English as first language was near threshold, X2(3) = 
7.48, p = .058, but not statistically significant. 
                                                          
18
 Model fit was good for all variables except age, PANAS NA, and single-item PA. Square-root 
transformation resolved poor fit for age and Log transformation resolved fit for PANAS NA; in both cases 
transformed data did not alter outcome of analyses. Model fit for single-item PA was not improved by 
either transformation; however, since histogram of standardised residuals for untransformed data was 
considered acceptable, untransformed data were used. 
19
 I.e., ≤ 20% of expected values were less than 5. 
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In addition, participants recruited through the university participant pool 
were compared with those recruited outside the pool. Univariate ANOVAs 
outlined above were repeated, this time with recruitment group as the between-
subjects factor; these two groups were compared on same baseline measures 
as the previous ANOVAs. Levene’s test was significant for three measures – 
PANAS NA, and single-item PA and NA. This violation was resolvable by 
square-root transformation for single item NA only; however, standardised 
residuals for all models of transformed demonstrated good fit and therefore the 
results were considered reliable. Univariate tests demonstrated no differences 
between groups on baseline variables (Fs ≤ 1.74; ps ≥ .188), with the exception 
of level of threat interpretation, F(1, 261) = 7.19, p = .008. Consequently, the 
sample was collapsed for analysis; however, potential differences between the 
participant pool subgroup and full sample were considered when analysing 
threat interpretation data. 
Manipulation Check 
The impact of the experimental manipulation on perceived thought speed 
was assessed through mixed-model 4x2x2 ANOVA. The ANOVA explored 
change in self-reported thought speed (across assessment points 1-4) X 
thought speed (fast/slow) X thought variability (varied/repetitive).20 The 
manipulation appeared successful;  significant difference in thought speed 
across assessment points was found between fast and slow thought speed 
manipulation conditions, F(2.37, 613.76) = 35.727, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12, with 
                                                          
20
 Mauchly’s test indicated violation of assumption of sphericity for both the 4x2x2 ANOVA (X
2
(5) = 
123.03, p < .001) and repeated-measures ANOVAs (slow thought speed: X
2
(5) = 114.68, p < .001; fast 
thought speed: X
2
(5)= 31.84, p < .001). Therefore, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity are 
reported as the corrected degrees of freedom. In addition, contrasts were only explored if multivariate 
test statistic was significant.  
Model fit was good for 4x2x2 ANOVA and subsequent repeated-measures ANOVA below. Of the four 
dependent variables, only ‘thought speed at assessment point 3’ demonstrated slightly poorer fit but 
consultation of standardised residuals histograms suggested adequate fit. 
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faster self-reported thought speed in the fast (M = 5.65, 95% CIs [5.42, 5.88], 
SE = .12) compared to slow condition (M = 4.76, 95% CIs [4.52, 4.99], SE = 
.12) – Figure 3. 
Figure 3. Graph illustrating estimated means of self-reported speed thought at 
assessment points 1-4 for slow and fast thought speed manipulation conditions. 
Simple contrasts indicated that the significant changes in thought speed 
lay between assessment points 1-2 and 1-3 (Fs ≤ 56.87, ps < .001). As would 
be expected, no significant difference in thought speed was found between 
varied versus repetitive thought conditions across assessment points, F(2.37, 
613.76) = 2.62, p = .064, ηp
2 = .01.  
Expanding the analysis above, two repeated-measures ANOVAs were 
conducted for slow and fast thought conditions, respectively, to investigate 
change in thought speed across the four assessment points within manipulation 
conditions. Analyses demonstrated significantly decreased thought speed in the 
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slow manipulation, F(1.96, 250.59) = 15.09, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11, and increased 
thought speed in the fast manipulation, F(23.67, 354.66) = 21.87, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .14. Simple contrasts revealed that the initial effect size, between assessment 
1-2, was large for the slow manipulation (ηp
2 = .14), and larger still for the fast 
manipulation (ηp
2 = .24). In both conditions, the manipulation effect remained 
significant (p < .001), but decreased in effect size at assessment points 3; 
returning to the pre-manipulation state at assessment point 4 (Fs ≤ 1.22, ps ≥ 
.272).  
Primary Research Question: The Effects of Change in Thought Speed and 
Variability on Symptoms of Anxiety and Mania 
 The study was concerned with whether manipulation of thought speed 
and variability influenced psychological state consistent with predictions based 
on the mental motion account. Of primary interest were changes in symptoms of 
anxiety and mania assessed via self-reported symptoms and threat 
interpretation. To explore the primary predictions, a series of 2x2 ANCOVAs 
were conducted – thought speed (fast/slow) X thought variability 
(varied/repetitive). The post-manipulation score (assessment point 2) on 
symptom of interest was entered as the dependent variable; and pre-
manipulation score (assessment point 1) entered as a covariate to account for 
baseline symptom level. ANCOVA was preferred over alternative tests as it is a 
powerful test well suited to the study design (Vickers & Altman, 2001). Where 
Levene’s test demonstrated violation of homogeneity assumptions, square-root 
data transformation was applied. This action was taken for ISS: activation and 
AST threat interpretation data. Transformation exacerbated rather than resolved 
the violation for threat interpretation. Standardised residuals, however, 
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demonstrated adequate model fit for untransformed threat interpretation data.21 
Finally, although Levene’s test was not significant for anxiety scores, as 
measured by the STAI-sf, model fit was improved by square-root transformation 
– consequently, transformed data for this variable were employed in analyses. 
Table 4 summarises ANCOVA output. 
 These analyses provided assessment of differences between 
manipulation conditions. Where significant between-group effects were found, 
these results were explored further through repeated-measures ANOVA to 
establish the direction and effect size within respective manipulation conditions 
pre-to-post manipulation. For example, if ANCOVA demonstrated significant 
difference between fast and slow thought speed conditions for an assessed 
dependent variable, then dependent variable change across assessment points 
1-2 was subsequently assessed within fast and slow conditions, respectively, by 
conducting separate repeated-measures ANOVAs for each condition. 
Hypothesis one: Self-report symptoms of mania and anxiety. 
ANCOVA supported the predicted association between manic symptoms, 
measured by ISS: activation, and increased thought speed and variability. As 
predicted, activation level was significantly higher in the fast thought condition 
(M = 12.6, SE = .34), compared to slow (M = 10.0, SE = .34), F(1, 258) = 30.20, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .11; and significantly higher in the variable thought condition (M 
= 11.9, SE = .34), compared to repetitive (M = 10.6, SE = .35), F(1, 258) = 7.41, 
p = .007, ηp
2 = .03.  
                                                          
21
  ≥ 95% of standardised residuals within -/+2. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Estimated Means with 95% Confidence Intervals from ANCOVA Relating to Symptoms of Anxiety, Mania, and 
Affective State 
     
Dependent variable (post-manipulation) Thought speed  Thought variability  
       
Estimated Mean [95% CI] Slow Fast Sig. Repetitive Varied Sig. 
       
State anxiety symptoms
n 
(STAI-sf) 
3.50 
[3.44, 3.57] 
3.55 
[3.49, 3.62] 
 
.314 
3.52 
[3.45, 3.59] 
3.54 
[3.47, 3.61] 
 
.636 
State mania symptoms
n 
(ISS: activation) 
9.97 
[9.29, 10.64] 
12.61 
[11.95, 13.28] 
 
<.001 
10.63 
[9.95, 11.32] 
11.95 
[11.29, 12.61] 
 
.007 
Positive affect 56.54 
[53.63, 59.46] 
61.43 
[58.57, 64.29] 
 
.019 
59.80 
[26.87, 62.74] 
58.17 
[55.33, 61.01] 
 
.432 
Negative affect 33.69 
[30.57, 36.82] 
29.05 
[25.99, 32.12] 
 
.038 
31.05 
[27.92, 34.17] 
31.70 
[28.68, 34.73] 
 
.766 
ISS: wellbeing 135.73 
[128.41, 143.05] 
146.68 
[139.50, 153.87] 
 
.037 
140.29 
[132.92, 147.66] 
142.12 
[135.00, 149.25] 
 
.725 
Threat interpretation (AST score) 21.45 
[20.69, 22.21] 
20.81 
[20.06, 21.55] 
 
.234 
21.45 
[20.68, 22.21] 
20.81 
[20.07, 21.55] 
 
.241 
   
                              Interaction 
        
Estimated Mean [95% CI] Slow, repetitive Slow, varied   Fast, repetitive Fast, varied Sig. 
        
State anxiety symptoms
n  
(STAI-sf) 
3.50 
[3.40, 3.60] 
3.51 
[3.41, 3.61] 
  3.54 
[3.44, 3.63] 
3.57 
[3.48, 3.66] 
 
.836 
State mania symptoms
n 
(ISS: activation) 
9.56 
[8.60, 10.53] 
10.37 
[9.43, 11.32] 
  11.71 
[10.74, 12.67] 
13.52 
[12.60, 14.44] 
 
.300 
Positive affect 56.73 
[52.56, 60.90] 
56.35 
[52.27, 60.44] 
  62.87 
[58.73, 67.01] 
60.00 
[56.02, 63.96] 
 
.551 
Negative affect 34.12 
[29.68, 38.56] 
33.27 
[28.90, 37.64] 
  27.97 
[23.56, 32.37] 
30.14 
[25.89, 34.39] 
 
.497 
ISS: wellbeing 133.44 
[122.95, 143.93] 
138.02 
[127.79, 148.25] 
  147.14 
[136.70, 157.58] 
146.23 
[136.28, 156.17] 
 
.601 
Threat interpretation (AST score) 21.89 
[20.80, 22.97] 
21.01 
[19.95, 22.07] 
  21.01 
[19.93, 22.08] 
20.61 
[19.58, 21.64] 
 
.658 
n
 = Square-root transformed data; Estimated means = Adjusted group means accounting for dependent variable pre-manipulation score as covariate. 
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Assessment of symptom change pre-to-post manipulation within fast and 
slow thought speed conditions, respectively, clarified these findings.  The 
repeated-measures ANOVAs demonstrated that activation level significant 
increased when manipulation induced fast thought speed, F(1, 133), 36.32, p 
<.001, ηp
2 = .21; but did not significantly change when thought speed was 
slowed, F(1, 128) = .79, p = .375, ηp
2 = .01. Similarly, within the thought 
variability conditions, only variable thought demonstrated within-group change. 
Activation increased when variable thought was induced, F(1, 135) = 
19.62, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13; but not when thought was repetitive, F(1, 126) = .50, 
p = .482, ηp
2 < .01. 
Contrary to prediction, ANCOVA demonstrated no differences in anxiety 
symptoms, measured by STAI-sf, between manipulation conditions. No 
significant main effects were demonstrated between thought speed, F(1, 258) = 
1.02, p = .314, ηp
2 < .001, or thought variability conditions, F(1, 258) = .23, p = 
.636, ηp
2 < .01.   
The mental motion account emphasises combinational role of thought 
speed and variability in differentiating anxious and manic states; however, no 
evidence was found for the predicted interaction for either symptoms of mania, 
F(1, 258) = 1.08, p = .3, ηp
2 < .01., or anxiety, F(1, 258) = .05, p = .826, ηp
2 < 
.01. 
Hypotheses two and three: Objective symptoms of mania and 
anxiety. Contrary to prediction, no evidence of condition-specific differences in 
threat interpretation, as measure by AST, was found between manipulation 
conditions. ANCOVA main effects were non-significant for thought speed, F(1 
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258) = 1.43, p = .234, ηp
2 = .01, and thought variability, F(1 258) = 1.40, p = 
.238, ηp
2 = .01. The interaction term (Speed X Variability) was also non-
significant, F(1 258) = .19, p = .660, ηp
2 < .01.  
As significant difference in baseline threat interpretation scores were 
found between participants recruited through the university participant pool and 
those not, the ANCOVA outlined above was repeated with these two groups 
included as a covariate. The results remained non-significant, Fs ≤ 1.42, ps ≥ 
.241. 
Secondary Research Question: Effects of Thought Speed and Variability 
on Affective State 
Of secondary interest were the predicted differences in affective state 
dependent on thought speed and variability manipulation. The analytic 
approach employed for the primary research question was repeated, with 
single-item PA and NA as dependent variables: 1) ANCOVA assessing between 
condition differences, and 2) repeated-measures ANOVA to assess within 
condition change pre-to-post manipulation. 
Where Levene’s test was significant in ANCOVA, square-root data 
transformation was applied. This action was taken for single-item PA. 
Transformation exacerbated rather than resolved the violation for PA and did 
not improve model fit. Consequently, untransformed data were utilised in this 
instance. Furthermore, the single-item NA ANCOVA and repeated-measures 
ANOVA for slow thought conditions demonstrated evidence of poorer model 
fit,22 which was not resolvable by transformation. Consequently, to improve 
reliability, PA and NA results should be considered with reference to related 
                                                          
22
 NA ANCOVA: 93.9% of standardised residuals within +/-2; NA ANOVA: 94.6% within +/-2. 
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study findings (e.g., Pronin & Jacobs, 2008; Yang et al., 2014). ANCOVA output 
is summarised in Table 4. 
Hypotheses four and five: Affective state. Consistent with prediction, 
ANCOVA demonstrated significant differences between thought speed 
conditions for both positive, F(1, 258) = 5.56, p = .019, ηp
2 = .02, and negative 
affect, F(1, 258) = 4.33, p = .038, ηp
2 = .02. Participants engaged in fast thought 
reported significantly higher levels of PA (M = 61.43, SE = 1.45) and lower 
levels of NA (M = 29.05, SE = 1.56), compared to the slow condition (Mpositive 
affect = 56.54, SE = 1.48; Mnegative affect = 33.69, SE = 1.58). 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs assessing within-group change pre-to-
post manipulation demonstrated significant decrease in PA, F (1, 128) = 20.23, 
p <.001, ηp
2 = .14, and increase in NA, F (1, 128) = 4.81, p = .030, ηp
2 = .04, 
within the slow thought condition. No significant changes were demonstrated in 
the fast thought condition for in either positive, F(1, 133) = 1.22, p = .271, ηp
2 = 
.01, or negative affect, F(1, 133) = 3.26, p = .073, ηp
2 = .02. 
Contrary to prediction, no differences were found between the thought 
variability conditions for either PA, F(1, 258) = .62, p = .432, ηp
2 < .01, or NA,  
F(1, 258) = .09, p = .766, ηp
2 < .01. Furthermore, no significant interactions 
(Speed X Variability) were demonstrated (Fs ≤ .46, ps ≥ .497). 
Mood State Classification  
In addition to the results outlined, ISS subscales were employed to 
generate mood state classifications; participants were dichotomously 
categorised as meeting criteria for each of the following categories, 
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respectively: (hypo)mania, depression, euthymia, and mixed-state.23 
Participants were categorised pre and post manipulation. As categorisation 
included manic and depressive states, the subsequent analyse were relevant to 
both primary (manic symptoms) and secondary (affective state) research 
questions.  
Four logistic regressions were conducted – one for each mood state 
category. Participant mood state post-manipulation was entered as the 
dependent variable. To account for baseline mood, pre-manipulation mood 
state was entered in the first step as a covariate. Thought speed, thought 
variability, and their interaction term (Speed X Variability), were entered as 
predictive variables in the second step. Model fit was good for prediction of 
(hypo)mania only, consequently the poorer fit of the remaining models should 
be borne in mind.24  
Thought speed significantly improved the predictive power of the model, 
above baseline mood state predictor, for the mood state categories of 
(hypo)mania and depression only. Table 5 summarises the significant model 
results. 
Consistent with prediction and the mental motion account, regression results 
demonstrated that, post-manipulation, more individuals met criteria for 
(hypo)mania in the fast thought speed condition compared to slow; and more 
individuals met criteria for depression in the slow thought speed condition 
compared to fast – Figures 4 and 5. However, thought variability did not predict 
association with either (hypo)mania or depression.  
                                                          
23
 Participants were coded (0 = not meeting ISS mood state criteria; 1 = meeting ISS mood state criteria) 
for each mood state category, respectively. 
24
 Removing outlier standardised residuals solely on basis of their lack of fit with model is considered 
bad practice (Field, 2005); rather, in the absence of explanation for such outliers, the limitations of the 
model must be acknowledged and future research may aim to clarify. 
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Table 5 
Logistic Regression Exploring Mood State Predicted by Thought Speed and 
Variability 
    
Dependent 
variable 
Predictors  95% CI for exp b 
      
  B (SE) Lower CI exp b Upper CI 
(Hypo)mania Constant -1.84*** (.35)  .16  
 Baseline ISS mania 
classification 
2.22*** (.35) 4.66 9.19 18.11 
 Thought speed 1.07* (.44) 1.23 2.90 6.83 
 Thought variability .21 (.46)  .50 1.23 3.01 
 Speed X Variability -.07 (.60) .29 .93 3.01 
R2 = .18 (Hosmer & Lemeshow); .21 (Cox & Snell); .29 (Nagelkerke). Model X2(4) = 61.71 
 
Depression Constant -1.21 (.32)  .30  
 Baseline ISS depression 
classification 
-2.70*** (.38) 7.13 14.93 31.30 
 Thought speed -.94* (.48)  .15 .39 .99 
 Thought variability -.09 (.43) .39 .92 2.13 
 Speed X Variability -.42 (.68) .17 .66 2.48 
R2 = .23 (Hosmer & Lemeshow); .24 (Cox & Snell); .35 (Nagelkerke); Model X2(4) = 71.77 
*** p < .001; ** p < .01; *p < .05  
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Figure 4. Number of participants meeting threshold for ISS (hypo)mania 
categorisation for slow and fast thought speed conditions (pre and post 
manipulation). 
 
 
  
 
Figure 5. Number of participants meeting threshold for ISS depression 
categorisation for slow and fast thought speed conditions (pre and post 
manipulation). 
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Discussion 
 The present study explored the impact of thought speed and variability 
on psychological state. The mental motion account predicts that these variables 
are causally related to specific psychological states, such as anxiety and mania, 
rather than simply being symptomatic of those states. This study extended 
previous research by further investigating whether condition-specific symptoms 
of anxiety and mania are induced by speed and variability of thought. Based on 
the theoretical account, increases in anxiety and manic symptoms were 
predicted to be associated with fast thought, but differentiable by the variability 
of that thought. These characteristics of how we think have been proposed to 
exert both individual and combinational effects. Critically, the combinational 
effects have been suggested to play a differentiating role between the specific 
psychological states of anxiety and mania (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). Changes 
symptom levels were assessed by both self-reported level and threat 
interpretation. Additionally, as affective state has been a consistent focus within 
the existing literature (e.g., Pronin et al., 2008), change in PA and NA was also 
included to evaluate the reliability of the present study findings. This study found 
supportive evidence that thought speed and variability do influence 
psychological state. The findings most consistently support the mental motion 
account of manic and affective state; relationship between mental motion and 
anxiety was unsupported suggesting the theory requires further development. 
Mental Motion and Symptoms of Anxiety and Mania 
 Based on the mental motion account it was predicted that specific 
changes in thought speed and variability would be associated with increases in 
anxiety and manic symptoms, respectively (hypotheses one-three). The 
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predictions were partially supported. Predominantly the mental motion account 
of manic thinking was supported; both fast and variable thought were 
independently associated with increased self-reported activation levels, a core 
symptom of mania (Mansell & Pedley, 2008). However, change in anxiety 
symptoms dependent on mental motion, and the predicted differentiation 
between anxiety and mania symptoms based on specific combinations of 
thought speed and variability, was not demonstrated. 
 Consistent with hypothesis one, manic symptoms differed significantly 
both between experimental manipulation conditions and within. Individuals in 
the fast thought speed condition exhibited higher levels of activation compared 
to those in the slow condition. Change in activation level within fast and slow 
thought speed conditions, respectively, suggested that the observed difference 
in activation level was largely driven by increases attributable to fast thinking, 
rather than decreases attributable to slow. Furthermore, ISS mood state 
categorisation demonstrated that thought speed predicts (hypo)manic state.  
Thought variability was also associated with manic symptoms; varied 
thought was associated with higher levels of activation compared to repetitive 
thought. Again, this difference appeared largely attributable to significant 
change on one level of thought manipulation; increased activation was only 
evident within the varied thought condition, and not the repetitive condition. 
However, it is acknowledged that inclusion of an active control group with 
normal pace and variability of thought for comparison is necessary to further 
clarify the reported effects. 
Collectively, these findings are consistent with previous evidence of 
increased manic symptoms (e.g., felt levels of energy, power, creativity, and 
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risk-taking) in fast compared to slow thought manipulations (Chanlder & Pronin, 
2012; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). They support a causal, as well as symptomatic, 
conception of the thought speed and variability associated with mania. A 
generic impact of mental motion on manic symptoms appears evident. 
However, increased speed and variability does not necessitate clinical levels of 
mania. Consequently, further factors, potentially such as differences in reactivity 
to affective change (Gruber, 2011) and appraisal of internal states (Mansell et 
al., 2007), require consideration to clarify what determines subsequent 
outcome. 
 Additionally, it was predicted that changes in threat perception consistent 
with decreased threat sensitivity may be evident alongside increased self-
reported manic symptoms. However, no evidence of change in threat 
interpretation was found. This study component was acknowledged as 
exploratory given the mixed evidence of threat sensitivity in mania (Carver & 
Johnson, 2009; Garcia-Blanco et al., 2014) and that existing interpretation bias 
research has predominantly focused on valence, not threat (e.g., Lex, 
Hautzinger, & Meyer, 2011; Thomas, Bentall, Knowles, & Tai, 2009). 
Consequently, the study results cannot be considered conclusive evidence that 
mania-consistent processing biases are not induced by manipulated changes in 
thought speed and variability. Further investigation is required. 
 In contrast to results pertaining to manic symptoms and contrary to 
prediction, anxiety symptoms (both self-report symptom level and threat 
interpretation) were not related to either differences in thought speed or 
variability. While the pace of worried thinking in anxiety has been suggested to 
demonstrate similarities with manic thinking (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008), anxiety 
frequently demonstrates co-morbidity with depression (Hirschfeld, 2001), a 
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condition characterised by slower, ruminative thinking. It has been suggested 
that anxious worried thought has differently themed content to depressed 
rumination (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008); it may be that association between 
mental motion and anxious psychological states cannot be accurately observed 
or understood without the consideration of thought content. 
 Critically, no evidence was found to support the predicted differentiating 
role of combined thought speed and variability. This combinational effect has 
been proposed to be potentially involved in clarifying similarities between some 
features of anxious and manic thinking styles (Pronin, 2013; Pronin & Jacobs, 
2008). However, this study demonstrated no significant interactions between 
thought speed and variability. 
Mental Motion and Affective State 
 As predicted in hypothesis four and five, affective experience was 
influenced by changes in thought speed. Consistent with multiple previous 
studies (e.g., Chandler & Pronin, 2012; Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 
2006; Yang et al., 2014), individuals engaging in fast, compared to slow, 
thought reported higher levels of PA and lower levels of NA. Although within-
group change pre-to-post manipulation was consistent with previous results that 
slow thought may cause decreased PA, this study did not replicate previous 
findings that fast thought causes significantly increased PA (Pronin et al., 2008 
– study six; Yang et al., 2014). However, a recent study that stratified results by 
depression level only found significant PA change in individuals with mild-
moderate depression, whereas change did not meet the threshold of statistical 
significance in those with minimal or no depression (Yang et al., 2014). 
Consequently, these findings may suggest that the affective influence of thought 
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speed partially depends on current affective experience (e.g., depression level); 
and that in the general population, slow thought speed demonstrates the 
strongest influence over mood, decreasing PA and increasing NA. Furthermore, 
slow thought, compared to fast, predicted ISS categorisation of depression. This 
finding provides further support of a possible relationship between thought 
speed and depression. 
 Contrary to predictions (hypotheses four-five), affective state did not 
appear influenced by thought variability. Previous research has found affective 
influence of thought variability but has often included consideration of thought 
content (e.g., worry and rumination: Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993; 
McLaughlin et al., 2007) or conceptual interrelationship between thoughts 
(Mason & Bar, 2011). The study results may further indicate the need to include 
thought content when investigating the impact of thought variability (Watkins, 
2008). 
Clinical Implications and Future Research 
 This research adds to emergent recommendations that psychological 
intervention may benefit from inclusion of components assessing and 
manipulating thought speed and variability (e.g., Bar, 2009; Pronin, 2013; 
Pronin & Jacobs, 2008). A body of literature is demonstrating that how we think 
our thoughts can causally influence psychological experience. This influence 
may broaden our understanding of the mechanisms of psychological difficulties, 
such as mania (Pronin & Wegner, 2006) and depression (Yang et al., 2014). 
This study also extends a developing field considering the value of experimental 
manipulations as interventions, as well as research methodologies (Hertel & 
Mathews, 2011). 
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Inclusion of therapeutic components targeting mental motion associated 
with specific psychological difficulties may broaden established cognitive-
behavioural intervention (Hofmann, Asnaani, Vonk, Sawyer, & Fang, 2012), 
such as by increasing thought speed to improve mood in mild-moderate 
depression (Yang et al., 2014); and potentially by inducing slower, more 
repetitive thought to reduce activation reinforcing factors in individuals with 
mania. 
 Furthermore, as these thought processes appear potentially causally 
related to the manifestation of manic symptoms, self-monitoring of thought 
speed and variability may enhance individuals’ awareness of current 
vulnerability to relapse and facilitate early intervention (Morriss et al., 2007). 
Indeed, thought speed (e.g., racing thoughts) is a common symptom of 
prodromal state in bipolar disorder (Lam & Wong, 2005). Regular, brief 
assessment of thought speed and variability may enable an individual to be 
aware of increasing risk factors for relapse and also to engage in brief targeted 
intervention to revert thinking to a more balance speed and level of variability. 
This advancement is consistent with NICE guidance for relapse prevention in 
mania (NICE, 2006), and may potentially provide additional avenues for 
supporting individuals, where currently the psychosocial recommendations are 
limited. 
It is stressed, however, that further research is required before 
intervention development. In particular, investigation in clinical populations is 
necessary to ascertain where and when manipulation of mental motion provides 
effective therapeutic change. Existing research suggests that in severe 
difficulties, manipulating mental motion may not have the same outcome as for 
moderate difficulties (Yang et al., 2014).  
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Limitations 
 The present study has a number of limitations. First, the study was 
conducted online rather than in a laboratory. Online research raises a number 
of concerns regarding the level of experimental control and comparability to 
existing lab-based evidence. However, comparability of lab-based and online 
experiments has demonstrated equivalence (Germine et al., 2012); and a 
variation on this study’s methodology has been successfully employed online 
(Yang et al., 2014).  
 Second, a control condition was not included. Although within-group 
change potentially provides some indication of the impact of deviation of 
thought speed and variability from normal levels, further investigation including 
a non-manipulated comparison control would extend understanding of typical 
thought speed and variability. 
Third, consistent with previous protocols, this study included self-
reported thought speed as a manipulation check. However, in replicating 
previous methods (Pronin & Jacobs, 2008), similar thought variability measure 
was not included, which compromises evaluation of the effectiveness of this 
manipulation. Positively, the significant differences found between, and within, 
thought variability conditions suggest that the manipulation was effective. 
However, future research should include a specific, repeated measurement to 
ascertain manipulation effect size and duration. Furthermore, the manipulation 
check within this study was limited to self-report, which is vulnerable to social 
desirability effects. Inclusion of objective assessment of manipulations (e.g., 
assessing thought speed through response-time in neutral decision-making 
tasks) would improve future research.  
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 Fourth, in replicating the previously published manipulation procedure, 
manipulation tasks varied in length. Consequently, the factor of time elapsing 
may also have influenced the results. Furthermore, additional extraneous 
variables potentially influenced by the manipulation, such as irritation or 
boredom associated with repetitive or unstimulating tasks, were not assessed. 
Consequently, their potential contribution to effects cannot be discounted. 
However, relative consistency between present findings and investigation 
utilising alternative manipulation tasks of varying method and duration (e.g., 
Pronin et al., 2008) affords confidence that mental motion variables are 
contributing to the observed effects. 
 Finally, comparison analysis of completers and non-completers revealed 
little between-groups difference – potentially limiting understanding of the 
observed attrition and generalizability of the sample. Again, consistency with 
previous research tempers this limitation. However, as the present study did not 
employ a clinical sample, generalizability to a clinical population cannot be 
assumed. 
Conclusion 
 The present study extends understanding of the independent effects of 
thought speed and variability on psychological state, specifically focusing of 
symptoms of anxiety and mania. The study findings suggest that the mental 
motion account, incorporating these attributes, may be most relevant to 
understanding changes in manic and affective states, rather than anxiety. 
Faster and more varied thought both independently contributed to increases in 
activation; whereas, affect was most significantly impacted on by slow, rather 
than fast, thought speed. Threat interpretation did not differ based on thought 
IMPACT OF THOUGHT SPEED AND VARIABILITY  97 
speed and/or variability and no evidence was found of the proposed 
combinational effect of mental motion variables in differentiating anxious and 
manic states. Consequently, the theory requires further development if anxiety 
is to be incorporated. Future research may aim to generate a more 
comprehensive theoretical account, incorporating other features of thought, 
such as content and relationship with that content (e.g., Gillanders et al., 2014; 
Hayes, Luoma, Bond, Masuda, & Lillis, 2006). 
In conclusion, the specificity of the influence exerted by thought speed 
and variability on internal state may prove useful for assessment and 
therapeutic intervention. However, understanding of the specific influence of 
these variables requires further confirmation and clarification, particularly in 
clinical populations. 
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Appendix A2: Participant Information Sheet 
The impact of thought speed and content on perception 
  
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to examine how the way people think influences the 
way they view and experience the world. The study aim is to explore how the 
speed and content of our thoughts may impact on how we interpret information 
and how we feel. It may be that specific psychological difficulties, like anxiety 
and mania, relate to these thought processes which are associated with 
tendencies to view the world in a particular, perhaps unhelpful, way. By 
understanding the impact of these processes we may better understand how to 
intervene to help people experiencing certain psychological difficulties. 
 
Procedures 
You must be aged eighteen years or older to participate in this study. 
Participating in this study involves watching a short video which requires 
reading a series of statements. The statements may be presented at a 
particular rate to affect the speed at which you read them. You will also be 
asked to complete a selection of questionnaires before and after watching the 
video. The first questionnaire asks questions about your background, such as 
your age, gender and education. The second set of questionnaires explores 
psychological variables, such as mood and anxiety. You will also be provided 
with a selection of stories before and after the video and asked to rate your 
experience of these stories. 
All information collected from your participation in this study will be stored in 
accordance with the ethical standards of confidentiality that govern 
psychologists. All identifying information will be separated from questionnaire 
responses. The data will be destroyed within seven years of completion of the 
study. 
 
Remuneration 
Your participation in this research is of great help and much appreciated. 
Unfortunately, no remuneration is offered for participation. [INCLUDED FOR 
PARTICIPANT POOL RECRUITMENT] At the very end of the study you will be 
provide with instructions about meeting with the researcher to gain your credit. 
[INCLUDED FOR PARTICIPANT POOL RECRUITMENT] 
 
Potential Risks and Ethical Consideration 
We would expect that for some people, watching the video may affect the way 
that they feel – they may feel anxious or activated/energised. These affects are, 
however, expected to be short lasting and there will be relaxation exercise at 
the end of the study to counteract these affects. We recommend that you 
complete the whole study, including relaxation exercise. In addition, it is 
possible some people may experience some discomfort while answering some 
of the person questions. If you feel you have any ongoing adverse reaction you 
can contact one of the study team. No other risks are known to the investigator 
at this time. 
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Benefits 
We don’t expect there to be any direct benefits to participants but by taking part 
you are helping us explore and understand how the way people think affects 
them. 
 
Confidentiality 
All information collected in this study is done so in confidence. Your data will be 
kept strictly confidential. We will anonymise your data by allocating you a 
participant identification number. All identifying information will be kept separate 
to your questionnaire responses. Data will be downloaded and stored on a 
password protected computer. All data will be deleted seven years after study 
completion. 
 
What will happen to the results of the research? 
The results will be written up in a doctorate thesis and made available to the 
University marking system. We also hope to publish the study results in a peer-
reviewed journal and present them at relevant conferences. Confidentiality will 
be ensured and no identifying information will be included in any of these 
activities. 
 
Withdrawal/Premature Completion 
Your participation is entirely voluntary and you may cease your involvement at 
any time without providing a reason. If you would like to withdraw your data you 
may do so by contacting the researcher below. Please note that if you have not 
requested for your data to be removed at the time of study completion your data 
may be included in write ups of the study, as stated above. 
 
Invitation to ask further questions 
If you have any further questions regarding this study before providing your 
consent to participation please contact the research using the contact 
information below. 
 
Contact Information 
Ben Rosser, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of Exeter 
br250@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Supervised by: 
Dr. Kim Wright, Senior Lecturer, University of Exeter 
K.A.Wright@exeter.ac.uk 
 
Dr. Barney Dunn, Associate Professor, University of Exeter 
B.D.Dunn@exeter.ac.uk 
  
This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of Exeter 
Ethics Committee. 
 
If you have any concerns about the study you may contact the Chair of Ethics at 
the University of Exeter: Dr. Cris Burgess C.N.W.Burgess@exeter.ac.uk 
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Appendix A3: Participant Consent Form 
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Appendix A4: Participant Debrief Information 
Participant debrief form 
  
Thank you for participating in this research. Without your input we could not complete 
this research. 
  
As stated at the beginning of the study, this research is interested in how the way 
people think influences the way they view and experience the world. The study is 
exploring the relation between the speed at which a person thinks and how they 
interpret ambiguous information. The statements you watched in the video were 
designed to temporarily influence the speed you were thinking at. The speed and the 
variety of the statements are different for different participants. 
  
This study is helping us explore the following research questions: 
1.       Does thinking varied thoughts quickly cause a decreased perception of threat? 
2.       Does thinking repetitive thoughts quickly cause an increased perception of 
threat? 
  
In particular, we are interested in how these ‘ways’ of thinking might be related to 
specific psychological difficulties like anxiety and mania. It is hoped that by 
understanding these processes and their relationship to psychological difficulties we 
may inform more effective treatments in the future. 
  
We do not anticipate any lasting effects of taking part in the study. The relaxation 
exercise at the end of the study should have left you feeling calm. However, if you 
continue to feel highly activated or anxious at a level that worries you, or this procedure 
has raised any issues relating to your psychological wellbeing, please contact one of 
the research team on the contact details listed below. Alternatively or additionally, you 
may wish to contact a local health professional, such as your doctor. 
  
Once again thank you for your help in this research. If you would like any further 
information about the study or if you would like to withdraw your data please contact us 
using the details below: 
  
Contact details 
Ben Rosser, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of Exeter 
br250@exeter.ac.uk 
  
Supervised by: 
Dr. Kim Wright, Senior Lecturer, University of Exeter 
K.A.Wright@exeter.ac.uk 
  
Dr. Barney Dunn, Associate Professor, University of Exeter 
B.D.Dunn@exeter.ac.uk 
  
This research has been reviewed and approved by the University of Exeter Ethics 
Committee. 
If you have any concerns about the study you may contact the Chair of Ethics at the 
University of Exeter: Dr. Cris Burgess C.N.W.Burgess@exeter.ac.uk 
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Appendix B: Measures and Materials 
Appendix B1: Demographic Information Questionnaire 
Participant Details 
Please answer the following questions about yourself: 
1. Please enter your date of birth 
a. DD/MM/YYYY 
2. What is your sex? 
a. Male/Female 
3. What is your marital status? 
a. Single 
b. In a couple, no married 
c. Married 
d. Divorced 
e. Widowed 
4. Is English you first language? 
a. Yes 
b. No, if no please state your first language 
5. In which country do you reside? 
6. What is your ethnicity? 
a. White 
b. Mixed – White and Black Caribbean 
c. Mixed – White and Black African 
d. Mixed – White and Asian 
e. Any other mixed background, please specify 
f. Indian 
g. Pakistani 
h. Bangladeshi 
i. Any other Asian background, please specify 
j. Black Caribbean 
k. Any other Black background, please specify 
l. Chinese 
m. Any other ethnic group, please specify 
7. Employment status 
a. Full-time employed  
b. Part-time employed 
c. Unemployed 
d. Full-time student 
e. Part-time student 
f. Do not work due to disability 
g. Retired 
8. Any diagnosis of mental health difficulties 
a. No 
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b. Depression 
c. Anxiety 
d. Mania 
e. Bipolar disorder 
f. Other, please specify 
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Appendix B2: Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad & Chapman, 
1986) 
Instructions: 
 
Please answer each item true or false.  Please do not skip any items.  It is 
important that you answer every item, even if you are not quite certain which is 
the best answer.  An occasional item may refer to experiences that you have 
had only when taking drugs.  Unless you have had the experience at other 
times (when not under the influence of drugs), mark it as if you have not had 
that experience. 
 
Some items may sound like others, but all of them are slightly different.  Answer 
each item individually, and don't worry about how you answered a somewhat 
similar previous item. 
 
IMPACT OF THOUGHT SPEED AND VARIABILITY  114 
  
IMPACT OF THOUGHT SPEED AND VARIABILITY  115 
Appendix B3: State-Trait Inventory for Cognitive and Somatic Anxiety 
(STICSA; Ree, MacLeod, French, & Locke, 2000; Grös, Antony, Simms, & 
McCabe, 2007) 
 
STICSA: Your General Mood State 
  
Instructions: 
  
Below is a list of statements which can be used to describe how people feel.  
Beside each statement are four options which indicate the degree with which 
each statement is true of you  (e.g., "not at all", up to "very much so"). Please 
read each statement carefully and select the option which best indicates how 
often, IN GENERAL, the statement is true of you. 
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Appendix B4: Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – short-form 
(STAI-sf; Marteau & Bekker, 1992) 
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Appendix B5: Internal State Scale (ISS; Bauer, Vojta, Kinosian, Altschuler, 
Glick, 2000)  
ISS 
 
For each of the following statements, please rate from 0-100% how well each 
statement describes the way you feel RIGHT NOW. 
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Appendix B6: Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988) 
PANAS 
  
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then mark the appropriate answer in the space 
next to that word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way RIGHT NOW, that is, 
at the present moment. 
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Appendix B6: Brief mood items  
 
 
Appendix B7: Self-Report Thought Speed Item 
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Appendix B8: Cognitive Fusion Questionnaire (Gillanders et al., 2014)  
Included in measures; related to additional question but not reported in 
the thesis as not related to thesis research question) 
CFQ13  
Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is 
for you by selecting a number next to it using the scale below to make your 
choice.  
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Appendix B9: Ambiguous Scenario Test (AST; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000) 
You will be presented with a series of short stories.  
  
After each story you will be presented with two statements that correspond to 
the story. Neither statement is worded identically to the story - please just rate 
each statement on how similar in meaning they are to the story. 
  
Please now read the following short stories. When reading the story, please 
imagine that you are the person being described. 
 
[AST SET 1 (1-10)] 
 
The wedding reception.  
Your friend asks you to give a speech at her wedding reception. You prepare 
some remarks and when the time comes, get to your feet. As you speak, you 
notice some people in the audience start to laugh.  
Please rate the statements below on how similar in meaning they are to the 
story you have just read. Rate them on the scale from 1-4, where 1= very 
different in meaning and 4 = very similar in meaning. 
As you speak, people in the audience laugh appreciatively. 
 As you speak, people in the audience find your efforts laughable. 
The local club.  
You are invited for a night out at a local club, although you don't know any of 
the members very well. As you approach the door you can hear loud music and 
noisy conversation, but as you enter the room it is quiet for a moment.  
Please rate the statements below on how similar in meaning they are to the 
story you have just read. Rate them on the scale from 1-4, where 1= very 
different in meaning and 4 = very similar in meaning. 
 As you enter the room the music stops for a moment. 
 As you enter the room everyone stops and stares at you.  
The bus ride.  
You get on a bus and find an empty seat next to one that has a rip in it. At the 
next stop several people get on that you vaguely recognise, but they sit together 
and the seat next to you remains vacant. 
Please rate the statements below on how similar in meaning they are to the 
story you have just read. Rate them on the scale from 1-4, where 1= very 
different in meaning and 4 = very similar in meaning. 
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 The seat next to you remains empty because it looks damaged. 
 The seat next to you is empty because no one wants to sit with you. 
The job interview.  
You applied for a job in a company you'd really like to work in. You are invited to 
an interview, where you answer the questions as well as you can. Reflecting 
later, you think that the quality of your answers decided the outcome. 
Please rate the statements below on how similar in meaning they are to the 
story you have just read. Rate them on the scale from 1-4, where 1= very 
different in meaning and 4 = very similar in meaning. 
 You think that your astute answers led to you being offered the job. 
 You think that your poor answers lost you the job. 
Meeting a friend.  
In the street, you bump into an old friend you haven't seen for a long time. She 
is too busy to stop, so you arrange to meet later in a bar. You arrive a little late 
but the bar is empty and a few minutes later she is still not there.  
 You arrange to meet a friend in a bar but your friend is late. 
 You arrange to meet in a bar but your friend stands you up. 
Your birthday.  
It is your birthday and you wake up looking forward to your day. You wonder 
how many friends will send you a birthday card. However, you have to go to 
work as usual, and by the time you leave, no cards have arrived. 
 You have to leave for work before the postman brings your mail. 
 You leave for work realising that no one has sent you a card. 
Your first painting.  
You've taken up painting as a hobby, and have just finished your first picture. 
You hang it on the wall when a group of friends visit. Later you overhear your 
friends making remarks that make clear their opinion of your ability. 
 You overhear some friends saying how much they liked your painting. 
 You overhear some friends making critical remarks about your picture. 
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The private view.  
Your neighbour invites you to a private exhibition of his art. You arrive to find 
many other guests whom you do not know. You try talking to some of them, and 
can see how interested they are in your conversation.  
 You talk to some guests and can tell that they find you interesting. 
 You talk to some guests but they think what you say is boring. 
The first aid refresher.  
You participate on a first aid refresher course at work. The instructor asks a 
question and no one in the group volunteers an answer, so he looks directly at 
you. You offer a reply, thinking about how your answer must be sounding to the 
others.  
 You answer the question, thinking that the others may be quite 
impressed. 
 You answer the question, thinking how ignorant you may seem. 
The joke.  
You are with a group of new friends, on your way to an open air concert. You 
decide to tell a joke you heard recently. Everyone looks at you as you start 
telling the joke, and you see their expressions change when you get to the 
punchline.  
 When you get to the end you see everyone starting to laugh. 
 When you get to the punch line everyone looks confused. 
[AST SET 2 (11-20)] 
Visiting the doctor.  
You have been feeling dizzy occasionally, and decide to get a check-up. You 
make an appointment right away. Your doctor takes your blood pressure and 
listens to your chest, and then tells you to relax while giving you his opinion.  
 The doctor tells you all is normal and you are in good health. 
 The doctor tells you bad news about your health. 
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Late return home.  
Your partner is working late this evening but now it is well past the time you 
were expecting them home. You are thinking about a crash you saw on the 
route your partner drives, when the phone rings. You pick it up and find out 
what had happened.  
 The phone rings and it is your partner telling you they are nearly home. 
 The phone rings and you are informed your partner is hurt in an accident. 
Your eye operation.  
You're finding that your sight is worse than it was and despite the risks you 
decide to try an experimental laser surgery you've read about. Afterwards as the 
bandages are taken off your eyes, you realise your life will be affected radically 
by the result. 
 You realise that this operation has made your vision perfect. 
 You realise that the operation has made your vision much worse.  
The evening stroll.  
You are taking a stroll on a quiet street near where you live. As you round the 
corner you see someone coming towards you on the same side of the road. As 
you meet, he stares straight at you and moves closer while raising his hand. 
 As you meet he waves in recognition and gives you a friendly greeting. 
 As you meet he moves closer and raises his fist menacingly. 
A flight abroad.  
You are on your way on holiday abroad. You have been in the air for an hour 
when you hear a change in the sound of the engine next to you. The fasten 
seat-belt sign flashes, and you hear the captain begin to make an 
announcement. 
 The seat belt light comes on and the captain says there will be
 turbulence. 
 The seat belt light comes on and the captain tells you one engine is
 failing. 
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At home one night.  
You are at home alone late one night. You have just finished reading and turn 
out the light to go to sleep. While lying in the dark you hear a soft rustling sound 
coming from just outside your window.  
 Lying in bed you hear the sound of a small animal outside your window. 
Lying in bed you hear the sound of someone trying to get in at your 
window. 
The screening clinic.  
You have been offered a routine cancer screening appointment at your local 
health centre. You have an X-ray and some samples are taken for tests. While 
waiting you see the doctor point out something on the X-ray plate to the nurse.  
 You notice the Doctor pointing out to the nurse that your X-ray is normal. 
 You notice the Doctor pointing out a tumour on your X-ray to the nurse. 
Walking home.  
You have been visiting some friends in the centre of town, when you realise it is 
getting late. They offer you a lift but you set off on foot. Walking through a street 
that you don't know at all well, you can hear someone running up from behind.  
 In the unfamiliar street your friend runs up from behind to walk with you. 
 In the unfamiliar street a mugger runs up from behind and threatens you. 
The exercise regime.  
You decide that you must start to exercise more. For the next week you take a 
little more exercise each day. After several weeks, you are running further and 
decide to see how far you can push yourself, when you notice your breathing is 
laboured. 
 Running further than usual you have to breath harder and deeper. 
 Pushing yourself too hard you cannot get enough air and feel dizzy. 
The car park.  
It is late at night and you are in a multi-storey car park trying to find your car. 
You have been looking for about ten minutes and still cannot find it. You hear a 
noise behind you and see a shadow of something. 
 You see a security person approaching to help you. 
 You see someone coming towards you looking threatening. 
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Appendix B10: Engagement and Technical Difficulties Questions 
The following questions relate to your experience of completing this study. 
Please answer all questions honestly. 
1. Did you experience any technical difficulties whilst completing the study – 
e.g., the video stuttering or not playing? 
a. No 
b. Yes, please specify 
2. Have you completed this study before? 
a. Yes/No 
3. Did you stop at any point and then come back to finish this study later? 
4. Did you watch the entire video and try to read all the words presented? 
a. Yes/No 
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Appendix B11: Manipulation Materials: Thought Speed Trivia Statements 
(provided by E. Pronin) 
Instructions:  
Shortly, a series of sentences will be presented on the screen one at a time. 
Please read every sentence as it appears, even if you have read that sentence 
before. 
 
Full list (used in the varied thought manipulation) 
1. Oranges contain Vitamin C.       
2. Pandas Bears are endangered animals.      
3. Coffee contains the stimulant caffeine.      
4. Donald Trump recently married Melania Knauss.    
5. The Hawaiian alphabet has 13 letters.      
6. A “fortnight” lasts for fourteen nights.      
7. English is the official language of Australia.     
8. A ghost writer pens an anonymous book.     
9. Europe is the only continent without deserts.     
10. The dessert Cranberry Jello-O contains real cranberries.   
11. Currently, domestic postage stamps cost forty-four cents.   
12. The national language of Brazil is Portuguese.     
13. Seven is the square root of forty-nine.      
14. Nova Scotia is Latin for New Scotland.      
15. Slang is a constantly changing part of language.    
16. Stretching is not likely to involve aerobic exercise.    
17. A sprinkler system protects a building against fire.    
18. You sign a contract “on the dotted line.”      
19. In most countries, UPS drivers wear brown uniforms.    
20. The planet Venus is known to rotate clockwise.     
21. The Easter holiday is always on a Sunday.     
22. America’s best selling ice cream flavor is vanilla.    
23. Most cars have either two or four doors.     
24. The equator separates the Northern and Southern hemispheres.  
25. Grabbing a quick rest is called “taking a catnap”.    
26. A drill is not commonly considered a gardening tool.    
27. The world’s largest alphabet is Cambodian, with 74 letters.   
28. The ancient Egyptians slept on pillows made of stone.    
29. The Empire State Building is in New York City.     
30. Walt Disney created the popular cartoon character, Mickey Mouse.  
31. The blue whale is the largest mammal on Earth.    
32. The four seasons are Winter, Spring, Summer, and Fall.   
33. The Hope Diamond was shipped from South Africa to London 
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34. A pilot light continually remains lit in a gas stove.     
35. In Ring Toss, players throw a loop over a peg.     
36. The TV series “Seinfeld” is set in New York City.    
37. A structure for keeping pigs in is called a sty.     
38. Australia is the only country that is also a continent.    
39. The planet Mars is named after the god of War.    
40. The city of Austin is the state capital of Texas.     
41. There are seven points on the Statue of Liberty’s crown.   
42. Water molecules contain two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. 
43. The Super Bowl game is always held on a Sunday.    
44. People say, one should not “bite the hand that feeds them.”   
45. There is no twelve of diamonds in a deck of cards.    
46. Some say, “the road to hell is paved with good intentions.”   
47. A proverb says, the pot should not call the kettle black.   
48. When a fish dies, it is said to “go belly up.”     
49. Columbus left for his first voyage across the Atlantic in 1492.   
50. The Capitol of the United States is located in Washington, DC.  
51. The Mona Lisa is one of the most famous portrait paintings.   
52. Neil Armstrong stepped on the moon with his left foot first.   
53. In England, people drive on the left side of the road.    
54. ABC’s schedule of TV shows is associated with the start of Fall.  
55. If something is really cheap, people say it’s “a dime a dozen.”  
56. The first airplane was flown at Kitty Hawk by the Wright Brothers.  
57. About one-tenth of the earth’s surface is permanently covered with ice. 
58. The Atlantic Ocean has more salt in it than the Pacific Ocean.  
59. An old saying claims that, “An apple a day keeps the doctor away.”  
60. Los Angeles is a city on the West Coast of the United States.  
61. New York City has more people than any other city in the United States. 
62. In lowercase, I and J are the only letters to have a dot on top.  
63. In the game of bowling, one must knock down 10 pins to get a strike. 
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Sets of three statements (used in the repetitive thought manipulation) 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the following six statement sets: 
Set 1: 
1. Stretching is not likely to involve aerobic exercise 
2. Slang is a constantly changing part of language. 
3. A sprinkler system protects a building against fire. 
Set 2: 
1. The planet Venus is known to rotate clockwise. 
2. You sign a contract “on the dotted line”. 
3. In most countries, UPS drives wear brown uniforms. 
Set 3: 
1. Grabbing a quick rest is called “taking a catnap.” 
2. The world’s largest alphabet is Cambodian, with 74 letters. 
3. A drill is not commonly considered a gardening tool. 
Set 4: 
1. The Empire State Building is in New York City. 
2. The ancient Egyptians slept on pillows made of stone. 
3. Walt Disney created the popular cartoon character, Mickey Mouse. 
Set 5: 
1. In Ring Toss, players throw a loop over a peg. 
2. The Hope Diamond was shipped from South Africa to London. 
3. A pilot light continually remains lit in a gas stove. 
Set 6: 
1. The TV series “Seinfeld” is set in New York City. 
2. Australia is the only country that is also a continent. 
3. A structure for keeping pigs in is called a sty. 
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Appendix B12: Varied/Repetitive Manipulation Conditions Procedural Flow 
To prevent presentation order effects with the presentation of trivia statements 
the following steps were taken:  
1. In the varied thought manipulation: participants were randomly allocated 
to one of six variations of the presentation order of the full 63 statements.  
2. In the repetitive thought manipulation: participants were randomly 
allocated to one of six statement sets (each with three statements – see 
Appendix B11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Participant entry 
Participant randomly allocated to either varied or repetitive manipulation  
Varied 
Randomly allocated to fast/slow version 
 
Random allocation to statement set 1-6 
Repetitive 
Randomly allocated to fast/slow version 
 
Random allocation to statement 
presentation order 1-6 
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Appendix B13: Relaxation Task (Progressive Muscle Relaxation) 
Relaxation exercise 
 
You have almost completed the study. Before the study ends please take part in 
this brief relaxation exercise. The purpose of the exercise is to leave you in a 
calm state at the end of the study. Please press play on the video and follow the 
instructions. 
 
[VIDEO GUIDING INSTRUCTED RELAXATION] 
 
Follow the instructions as they are presented on screen. 
Find a comfortable sitting position. 
Slow down your breathing 
In your head, slowly say ‘one thousand’ as you inhale 
And ‘two thousand’ as you exhale. 
Relax the following areas of your body for as long as the words of the body part 
appear on the screen 
Focus on your right arm, 
Allow it to become loose and relaxed 
Focus on your left arm, 
Allow it to become loose and relaxed 
Focus on your face,  
Allow it to become relaxed and neutral in expression 
Focus on your jaw, 
Allow it to become loose and relaxed 
Focus on your shoulders, 
Allow them to drop comfortably and become relaxed 
Focus on your chest, 
Allow it to fill and empty with air slowly 
Focus on your right leg, 
Allow it to become loose and relaxed 
Focus on your left leg, 
Allow it to become loose and relaxed 
Bring your attention back to your breathing, 
Allow it to be slow and comfortable 
Allow yourself to rest for a few moments before continuing. 
When you are ready please continue into the final part of the study. 
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Appendix C: Expanded Methods 
Appendix C1: Power Analysis 
 Power calculations were performed using G*Power 3.1.7. Power 
analyses were calculated for the 2x2 ANCOVA (Thought Speed X Thought 
Variability) as this was the main method of analysis – Table C1. Required 
sample size was based on the interaction effect as this requires larger numbers 
than the main effect alone. 
Table C1 
Summary of Power Analysis and Sample Size Calculation 
 Number 
of levels 
Numerator 
df 
Number of 
covariates 
α Effect 
size 
Power Sample 
size 
required 
Thought 
speed (A) 
2 1 (A-1) 1 .05 .25 .8 128 
Thought 
variability 
(B) 
2 1 (B-1) 1 .05 .25 .8 128 
Speed X 
Variability 
(A*B) 
4 2 (A-1*B-1) 1 .05 .25 .8 158 
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Appendix C2: Pilot Study  
Prior to the main study, a small pilot study was conducted, with the 
researcher physically present, to ascertain the acceptability of the research 
before it was made widely accessible online. The study was completed on PC 
or laptop, either in a university computer-lab or participant home. Participants 
were asked 10-point likert items on level of acceptability of the study (0 = not at 
all acceptable; 10 = very acceptable), and level of distress caused by 
participation (0 = not distressing at all; 10 = very distressing). Participants were 
also asked their opinions on study length and the usefulness of the relaxation 
task – results are summarised in Table C2. 
Table C2 
Summary of Pilot Study Demographic Details and Acceptability Results 
Demographic details 
Sex Mean age (SD) Marital status Employment 
80% female 29.84 years (2.62) 50% married 90% full-time employment 
  40% couple, not married 10% student 
  10% single  
Acceptability responses; mean (SD) 
Acceptability Distress Study length* Relaxation task 
8.80 (.79) .89 (1.69) 2.3 (.48) 1.9 (.32) 
N = 10; Participants took on average 36.4 minutes to complete the study. * how did you find the study 
length? 1 = too short; 2 = about right; 3 = too long. 
The opportunity sample rated the study as highly acceptable and not 
distressing. Seventy-percent of participants reported the study length as “about 
right”. The relaxation task was found useful (60%) and of appropriate length 
(90%). Consequently, the research procedure remained unchanged for the 
main study. 
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Appendix C3: Data Screening and Reduction  
Study completion and technical difficulties. Data were screened 
based on study completion and technical difficulties. Of the full sample (N = 
603), data were included if the participant had completed all questionnaire 
components (n = 348), and had not completed the study previously or found the 
manipulation video had failed to play (n = 332).  
Completion of manipulation task. Participants were also screened on 
time spent on the manipulation video webpage. This variable was used as an 
indicator of level of participation in manipulation task. It was possible to screen 
by level of participation using either a condition specific cut-off (i.e., percentage 
of video watched; the duration of which varied across fast and slow presentation 
conditions) or standard cut-off across all conditions (i.e., a set minimum duration 
of video watched irrespective of condition). Screening criteria for both methods 
were generated and compared.  
Two comparison data sets were generated based on the following 
criteria: 1) participants time on video webpage was ≥ 90% of the shortest video 
congruent with their condition (i.e., ≥ 138.6secs for participants in the fast 
presentation condition; ≥ 627.2secs for slow presentation condition) (n = 245); 
and 2) participant time on webpage ≥ 138.6secs (i.e., 90% of the shortest video 
out of all the conditions) (n = 287). For both data sets an additional high cut-off 
point was applied; time watching video no more than 1min longer than the 
duration of the longest video dependent on participant condition (i.e., ≤ 232secs 
for fast presentation condition; ≤ 836secs for slow presentation condition). 
The effect of the manipulation on participant thought speed, assessed by 
the self-report item, was comparable across the two data sets. In both instances 
ANOVA demonstrated significant effects in the same direction and of 
comparable effect size. Therefore, as the standardised duration screening 
method provided the largest sample with the most balanced numbers across 
conditions, this screening method was selected (n = 285).  
Finally, participants were excluded if the total time to complete the entire 
study was greater than 1 ½ hrs (N = 263). 
  Outliers in dependent variables. To reduce the influence of extreme 
data points, dependent variables were assessed for outliers. Outliers were 
defined as data points ≥ 75 percentile + 1.5xInterquartile range; and ≤ 25 
percentile – 1.5xInterquartile range. The Winsorising approach to outliers was 
employed – i.e., replacement of outliers with the nearest acceptable non-
outlying data point. 
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Appendix D: Expanded Results 
Appendix D1: Comparison Analyses of Study Completers versus Non-
completers 
Multivariate test demonstrated no significant difference between 
completers and non-completers, Pillai’s Trace = .038, F(13, 362) = 1.09, p = 
.365, for continuous demographic and dependent variables at baseline. 
Assumptions of homogeneity was support by Levene’s test for all variables (all 
ps > .1) and Box’s test (p = .588). 
Standardised residuals in the Chi-square tests did not reveal a significant 
difference between completers and non-completers in terms of their marital 
status, X2(4) = 1.59, p = .810, first language as English, X2(1) = .38, p = .535, 
and diagnosed mental health difficulties, X2(4) = 3.43, p = .489. Non-completers 
were, however, significantly different to completers in terms of sex, X2(1) = 5.87, 
p = .015, with less of a discrepancy between numbers of men and women 
(ratio: 1:1.64) in non-completers compared to completers (ratio: 1:2.55). Non-
completers also differed on employment status, X2(6) = 21.0, p = .002; non-
completers were more frequently part-time employed or not working due to 
disability, and less frequently a full-time student. Chi-square tests were not 
appropriate for the variables of country or ethnicity as the number of expected 
counts with a value less than five exceeded 25%; however, descriptive statistics 
show that, as with completers, in the non-completer group then most frequently 
reported their country of residence as the UK (36.9%) and USA (33.7%); and 
ethnicity as white (66.7%). 
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Appendix D2: Assumptions and Model Fit 
Normality 
The sample size entailed (N > 30 for each group) that assumptions of 
normality were met according to Central Limit Theorem.  
Homogeneity of Variance 
 Levene’s test was consulted to assess homogeneity of variance in 
between-groups analyses. Violations were noted in thesis text. Data were 
treated with square-root or log transformations to resolve violation; where 
violation could not be resolved, this was acknowledged in thesis text in 
reference to the model fit – see Appendix E3 for full details of where Levene’s 
test was violated, standardised residuals evaluating model fit, and action taken.  
Sphericity 
 Mauchly’s test was consulted for the repeated-measure ANOVAs with 
repeated-measures with two or more levels – see Results: ‘manipulation check’ 
section. As Mauchly’s test indicated violation of assumption of sphericity for 
both the 4x2x2 ANOVA, X2(5) = 123.03, p < .001, and repeated-measures 
ANOVAs (slow thought speed: X2(5) = 114.68, p < .001; fast thought speed: 
X2(5)= 31.84, p < .001, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (slow 
condition: Ɛ = .65; fast condition: Ɛ = .89) are reported as the corrected degrees 
of freedom. 
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Appendix D3: Assessment of Model Fit 
 Model fit for all linear model analyses was evaluated through consulting Levene’s test and the standardised residuals 
for each model. Table D3 summarises the standardised residuals for all analysis models; model fit was evaluated (percentage 
of standardised residuals within +/-2 and +/-3 respectively), and what course of action was taken to resolve poor fit is also 
outlined. In addition, violations of homogeneity as assessed by Levene’s test are also noted; Levene’s test is only reported 
when significant. 
Table D3 
Summary of Standardised Residuals, Evaluation of Model Fit, and Action Taken 
SECTION: Baseline comparisons (all DVs are baseline; assessment point 1) 
Analysis IV DV Covariate Std. 
Resid.
within 
+/- 2 
Std. 
Resid. 
within
+/- 3 
Adequate 
fit 
Action taken Outcome of action 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
Thought speed N/A 95.8% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
HPS N/A 97.3% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
STICSA N/A 97% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
STAI-sf N/A 96.6% 99.6% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
ISS: activation N/A 95.8% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
ISS: wellbeing N/A 95.9% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
PANAS: PA N/A 97.7% 100% YES N/A N/A 
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Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
PANAS: NA N/A 89.7% 100% NO 
Levene’s 
test sig. 
SQRT transformation Levene’s remained sig.  
BUT: 100% within +/- 2 
Transformed data used. 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
Single-item PA N/A 95.1% 100% YES 
 
Levene’s 
test sig. 
SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
SQRT did not resolve levene’s 
 
LOG did not resolve levene’s 
 
As model fit was adequate, 
untransformed data were used 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
Single-item NA N/A 93.9% 100% NO 
 
Levene’s 
test sig. 
SQRT transformation Levene’s non-sig. 
 
95.4% +/-2 
100% +/-3 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
Participant pool vs. non-
pool 
AST Threat N/A 96.2% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
Age N/A 93.5% 97.7% NO SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
SQRT  did not improve fit 
 
LOG = 93.5% +/- 2; 100% +/-3 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
Thought speed N/A 96.2% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
HPS N/A 97% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
STICSA N/A 95.8% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
STAI N/A 95.4% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
ISS: activation N/A 95.8% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
ISS: wellbeing N/A 96.5% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
PANAS PA N/A 96.9% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
PANAS NA N/A 92.8% 100% NO SQRT transformation Adequate fit: 98.1% +/- 2; 
100% +/-3 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
Single-item PA N/A 93.9% 100% NO SQRT transformation  
 
LOG transformation  
 
Histogram consulted 
Both transformations made fit 
worse, so untransformed data 
used – untransformed data 
histogram of std. residuals was 
very slightly negatively skew 
but generally acceptable. 
IMPACT OF THOUGHT SPEED AND VARIABILITY  139 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
Single-item NA N/A 95.8% 99.6% YES N/A N/A 
Univariate ANOVA Between subjects: 
RF/RS/VF/VS  
AST threat N/A 97.3% 100% YES N/A N/A 
SECTION: Manipulation check (DV at assessment points 1-4) 
Analysis IV DV Covariate Std. 
Resid.
within 
+/- 2 
Std. 
Resid. 
within
+/- 3 
Adequate 
fit 
Action taken Outcome of action 
4x2x2 ANOVA Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-4) 
 
Between subjects: 
1.speed (fast/slow) 
2.variability (varied/rep.) 
Thought speed 
1 
N/A 96.2% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Thought speed 
2 
N/A 97% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Thought speed 
3 
N/A 94.3% 100% NO Histogram consulted 
 
SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
 
(applied to thought 
speed 1-4) 
Both transformations 
worsened fit and Levene’s 
 
Untransformed data was very 
close to good fit; histogram of 
std. residuals was acceptable. 
 
Untransformed data used. 
  Thought speed 
4 
N/A 95.5% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA  
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-4) 
 
Fast thought speed 
conditions only 
Thought speed 
1 
N/A 95.6% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Thought speed 
2 
N/A 97% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Thought speed 
3 
N/A 93.3% 99.3% NO Histogram consulted  
SQRT transformation 
LOG transformation 
 
(applied to thought 
speed 1-4) 
Both transformations worsen 
model fit. 
Untransformed data histogram 
was acceptable. 
 
Untransformed data used as 
provides best fit. 
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  Thought speed 
4 
N/A 94% 100% NO N/A N/A 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA  
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-4) 
 
Slow thought speed 
conditions only 
Thought speed 
1 
N/A 96.1% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Thought speed 
2 
N/A 99.2% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Thought speed 
3 
N/A 98.4% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Thought speed 
4 
N/A 96.8% 100% YES N/A N/A 
SECTION: H1: Self-report symptoms of mania and anxiety 
Analysis IV DV Covariate Std. 
Resid.
within 
+/- 2 
Std. 
Resid. 
within
+/- 3 
Adequate 
fit 
Action taken Outcome of action 
ANCOVA Thought speed x 
variability 
ISS: activation 
(post) 
ISS: 
activation 
(pre) 
94.7% 100% NO 
 
Levene’s 
test sig. 
SQRT transformation Does not improve residuals 
(94.7% +/-2) 
 
But levene’s not sig.  
 
SQRT data used 
ANCOVA Thought speed x 
variability 
STAI-sf (post) STAI-sf (pre) 93.9% 100% NO SQRT transformation Resolved fit 
 
95.1% +/-2 
100% +/-3 
 
Transformed data used 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Fast thought speed 
conditions only 
ISS: activation 
(pre) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 96.3% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  ISS: activation 
(post) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 95.5% 100% YES N/A N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
IMPACT OF THOUGHT SPEED AND VARIABILITY  141 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Slow thought speed 
conditions only 
ISS: activation 
(pre) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 94.5% 100% NO Compared to 
untransformed data 
 
AND consulted 
histograms between 
data sets 
Untransformed data = 95.3% 
+/-2 
 
BUT better normal distribution 
in SQRT data 
 
Consequently, SQRT data 
used 
 
NB: ANOVA results were 
comparable between data sets 
  ISS: activation 
(post) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 94.6% 100% NO Compared to 
untransformed data 
 
AND consulted 
histograms between 
data sets 
Untransformed data = 95.3% 
+/-2 
BUT better normal distribution 
in SQRT data 
 
Consequently, SQRT data 
used 
 
NB: ANOVA results were 
comparable between data sets 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Varied thought speed 
conditions only 
ISS: activation 
(pre) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 94.1% 100% NO Compared to 
untransformed data 
 
AND consulted 
histograms between 
data sets 
Untransformed data = 94.9% 
+/-2 
 
BUT better normal distribution 
in SQRT 
 
SQRT data used 
 
NB: ANOVA results were 
comparable between data sets 
  ISS: activation 
(post) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 95.6% 100% YES Compared to 
untransformed data 
(due to pre score 
violation) 
 
AND consulted 
histograms between 
data sets 
Better residuals and 
distribution found in 
transformed data 
 
SQRT data used. 
 
NB: ANOVA results were 
comparable between data sets 
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Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Repetitive thought speed 
conditions only 
ISS: activation 
(pre) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 98.4% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  ISS: activation 
(post) 
 
SQRT data 
N/A 99.2% 100% YES N/A N/A 
SECTION: H2-3: Objective symptoms of mania and anxiety 
Analysis IV DV Covariate Std. 
Resid.
within 
+/- 2 
Std. 
Resid. 
within
+/- 3 
Adequate 
fit 
Action taken Outcome of action 
ANCOVA Thought speed X 
variability 
AST threat 
(post) 
AST threat 
(pre) 
95.9% 100% YES 
 
But levene’s 
test sig. 
SQRT 
transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
SQRT = 95.8% +/-; Levene’s 
still sig. 
 
LOG = 95.4% +/-2; Leven’s 
still sig. 
 
Untransformed data used. 
NB: ANCOVA results were 
comparable between data sets 
ANCOVA Thought speed X 
variability 
AST threat 
(post) 
AST threat 
(pre) 
 
AND 
Participant 
pool vs. non-
pool 
95.2% 100% YES 
 
But levene’s 
test sig. 
SQRT 
transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
 
AND consulted 
histograms 
SQRT = 95.8% +/-2; Levene’s 
still sig. 
 
LOG = 95.8% +/-2; 99.6% +/-
3; Levene’s still sig. 
 
Histograms between SQRT 
and untransformed data both 
demonstrate normal 
distribution. 
 
As Levene’s not resolved by 
transformation and residuals 
not substantially improved, 
untransformed data used. 
 
NB: ANCOVA results were 
comparable between data sets 
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SECTION: H4-5: Affective state 
Analysis IV DV Covariate Std. 
Resid.
within 
+/- 2 
Std. 
Resid. 
within
+/- 3 
Adequate 
fit 
Action taken Outcome of action 
ANCOVA Thought speed X variability Single-item 
PA (post) 
Single-item 
PA (pre) 
94.3% 98.5% NO SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
 
AND histograms 
consulted 
SQRT = 94.6% +/-2; 97.7% 
+/-3; Levene’s still sig. 
 
LOG = 95% +/-2; 97.7% +/-
3; Levene’s still sig. 
 
Untransformed data used 
as best fit, histogram 
demonstrated normal 
distribution, and best 
Levene’s statistic 
 
NB: ANCOVA results were 
comparable between data 
sets 
ANCOVA Thought speed X variability Single-item 
NA (post) 
Single-item 
NA (pre) 
93.9% 99.2% NO SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
 
AND histograms 
consulted 
SQRT = 93.9% +/-2; 98.8% 
+/-3 
 
LOG = 93.9% +/-2; 98.4% 
+/-3 
 
Histograms demonstrated 
normal distribution for all 
sets; best for SQRT (NB: 
ANCOVA for SQRT 
provided comparable 
results to untransformed). 
 
Untransformed data used 
as best fit and distribution 
appeared normal 
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Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Fast thought speed 
conditions only 
Single-item 
PA 
(pre) 
 
N/A 94.8% 100% NO SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
 
SQRT =  
94.8% +/-2; 100% +/-3 
 
LOG =  
94.8% +/-2; 94.8% +/-3 
 
Untransformed data used 
as best fit (very near 
adequate) 
  Single-item 
PA 
(post) 
N/A 94.8% 100% NO SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
 
SQRT =  
94% +/-2; 100% +/-3 
 
LOG =  
94% +/-2; 94.8% 96.3%+/-3 
 
Untransformed data used 
as best fit (very near 
adequate) 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Slow thought speed 
conditions only 
Single-item 
PA 
(pre) 
 
N/A 95.3% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Single-item 
PA 
(post) 
N/A 100% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Fast thought speed 
conditions only 
Single-item 
NA 
(pre) 
 
N/A 96.3% 100% YES N/A N/A 
  Single-item 
NA 
(post) 
N/A 96.3% 100% YES N/A N/A 
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Repeated 
measures ANOVA 
Repeated measures: 
Assessment point (1-2) 
 
Slow thought speed 
conditions only 
Single-item 
NA 
(pre) 
 
N/A 94.6% 99.2% NO SQRT transformation 
 
LOG transformation 
 
SQRT = 94.5% +/-2; 100% 
+/-3 
 
LOG = 94.2% +/-2 
 
Untransformed data used 
as consistent with NA 
ANCOVA and fit only 
slightly improved by SQRT 
(and SQRT and  
untransformed ANOVA 
results were comparable) 
  Single-item 
NA 
(post) 
N/A 95.3% 100% YES SQRT transformation 
only conducted for 
comparison with pre 
score  
SQRT = 95.3% +/-2; 100% 
+/-3 
 
Untransformed data used 
SECTION: Mood state classification 
Analysis IV DV Covariate Std. 
Resid.
within 
+/- 2 
Std. 
Resid. 
within
+/- 3 
Adequate 
fit 
Action taken Outcome of action 
Logistic regression Thought speed 
 
Thought variability 
 
Speed X Variability 
Hypomania 
(0 = does not 
meet criteria; 
1 = meets 
criteria) 
Baseline 
categorisatio
n (meeting or 
not meeting 
criteria) 
95.4% 100% YES N/A N/A 
Logistic regression Thought speed 
 
Thought variability 
 
Speed X Variability 
Mixed state 
(0 = does not 
meet criteria; 
1 = meets 
criteria) 
Baseline 
categorisatio
n (meeting or 
not meeting 
criteria) 
93.9% 98.1% NO No action taken as 
extreme outliers 
already conservative 
treated in data 
screening 
Model fit reported in thesis 
text 
Logistic regression Thought speed 
 
Thought variability 
 
Speed X Variability 
Euthymia 
(0 = does not 
meet criteria; 
1 = meets 
criteria) 
Baseline 
categorisatio
n (meeting or 
not meeting 
criteria) 
94.7% 97.7% NO No action taken as 
extreme outliers 
already conservative 
treated in data 
screening 
Model fit reported in thesis 
text 
Logistic regression Thought speed 
 
Thought variability 
 
Speed X Variability 
Depression 
(0 = does not 
meet criteria; 
1 = meets 
criteria) 
Baseline 
categorisatio
n (meeting or 
not meeting 
criteria) 
94.7% 98.1% NO No action taken as 
extreme outliers 
already conservative 
treated in data 
screening 
Model fit reported in thesis 
text 
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Appendix E: Dissemination Information 
Appendix E: Dissemination Statement 
 Study results are intended to be disseminated through several means. 
First, they will be reported, in conference-style presentation, to the course 
programme and other clinical psychology trainees as part of the clinical 
doctorate. Furthermore, study summary poster or presentation may also be 
made to the wider psychological community through national conference, such 
as those convened by the British Psychological Society. Finally, the study is 
intended for submission for publication in a peer-reviewed journal, such 
Cognitive Therapy and Research.  
 
Appendix E1: Author Instruction for Submission (Cognitive Therapy and 
Research)  
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Manuscript Submission 
Manuscripts in English, should be submitted to the Editor via the journals web−based online manuscript submission 
and peer−review system – Editorial Manager. Click on Submit Online 
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